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Abstract
This Note discusses the history behind the global war on drug-related money laundering, and
India’s efforts at joining the movement. Part I will describe the nature of money laundering as well
as various international and national attempts to combat it. Part II will explore arguments for and
against India’s use of anti-money laundering legislation as a method of controlling the growing
heroin trade. The Note concludes that it is imperative that India implement a comprehensive
anti- money laundering regime, which includes compliance programs and bilateral and multilateral
agreements on mutual legal assistance in order to suppress its growing heroin trade.
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INTRODUCTION
Drugs and money laundering are inextricably linked.' Drug
trafficking and abuse now plague the global community.2 Few
individuals will dispute that narcotics trafficking has become one
of the most lucrative underground economies, generating bil-
lions of dollars annually.3 The war against drugs has risen to
such a paramount concern that it has brought law enforcement
officials around the world together in an effort to control drug
trafficking.4
Law enforcement organizations are attempting to curb the
escalating levels of narcotics trafficking by gaining some control
over money laundering practices.5 Law enforcement officials
hope that if the proceeds of drug trafficking cannot find their
way back to narcotics producers, then the importation of drugs
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1. See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hernandez, RIP to IRP - Money Laundering and Drug
Trafficking Controls Score a Knockout Victory Over Bank Secrecy, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 235, 235-39 (1993) (discussing nexus between illicit drug trafficking and money
laundering).
2. See Bruce Zagaris, Developments in International Judicial Assistance and Related Mat-
ters, 18 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'v 339 (1990) (stating that international drug trade has
penetrated fabric of society throughout world).
3. See Peter J. Quirk, Money Laundering: Muddying the Macroeconomy, FINANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT, Mar. 1997, at 8 (stating that approximate US$500 billion of illicitly ob-
tained funds pass through international banking system annually); see also Hernandez,
supra note 1, at 235-36 (estimating that US$300 billion are laundered each year
through international banking system).
4. See, e.g., The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, UN doc. E/CONF. 82/15, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493
(1989) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention represents an inter-
national response to the awakened need for "concerted and more effective action" to
harness money laundering. See David P. Stewart, Internationalizing the War on Drugs: The
UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 18 DENY.
J. INT'L L. & POL'v 387, 387 (1990).
5. See Abraham Abramovsky, Money Laundering and Narcotics Prosecution, 54 FoRD-
HAM L. REV. 471, 472 (1986) (discussing how U.S. government is trying to gain some
control over money laundering practices in effort to combat illegal importation of nar-
cotics into United States).
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may decline.6 As a result, countries heavily involved in narcotics
trafficking are slowly instituting anti-money laundering statutes
in an effort to combat narcotics trafficking and abuse.7
India is no exception to this trend.' India is currently suf-
fering from a burgeoning narcotics trade9 and the crimes associ-
ated with it."° This Note discusses the history behind the global
war on drug-related money laundering, and India's efforts at
joining the movement. Part I will describe the nature of money
laundering as well as various international and national attempts
to combat it. Part II will explore arguments for and against In-
dia's use of anti-money laundering legislation as a method of
controlling the growing heroin trade. The Note concludes that
it is imperative that India implement a comprehensive anti-
money laundering regime, which includes compliance programs
and bilateral and multilateral agreements on mutual legal assist-
ance in order to supress its groing heroin trade.
6. See id. (stating hope among government authorities that if "drug money cannot
find its way back to narcotics producers, then the importation of drugs may decline.").
7. See, e.g., Initiative by the Organization of American States to Prepare Model Reg-
ulations on the Laundering of Property and Proceeds Related to Drug Trafficking: Ar-
ticles Considered by the Inter-American Group of Experts, Dec. 9-13, 1991, OEA/Ser.
L/XV, 4.4, CIDAD/GT. Lavex/doc. 20/19 [hereinafter OAS Laundering Regula-
tions], reprinted in INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS To COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING 4 et seq (Dr.
W.C. Gilmore, ed., 1992) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS]. The Model Regula-
tions represent a multilateral effort by the countries of Latin America and the Carib-
bean to effectively combat drug-related money laundering. See CHARLES INTRIAGO, IN-
TERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING 38-42 (1991) (discussing initiatives taken by Organiza-
tion of American States to combat money laundering in Latin America and Caribbean);
Lawrence L.C. Lee, Note, Combating Illicit Narcotics Traffic in Taiwan: The Proposed Money
Laundering Control Act, 4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 189, 211 (1996)(discussing Money
Laundering Control Act in Taiwan); PaulinaJ. Jerez, Proposed Brazilian Money Laundering
Legislation: Analysis and Recommendations, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 329, 352-54
(1997) (discussing Brazil's proposed anti-money laundering legislation).
8. See Letter From the President to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House Com-
mittees on Appropriations and International Relations and the Senate Committees on Appropria-
tions and Foreign Relations, Nov. 10, 1997, available in Wesdaw WL 702614 (White House)
(citing India as one among group of major illicit drug-producing or drug-transit coun-
tries).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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I. THE CRIME OF MONEY LAUNDERING AND ATTEMPTS TO
COMBAT IT
Money laundering is a problem that concerns the world. 1
While once thought to be a relatively small problem,' 2 global
money laundering has now reached astounding levels.'" It is
now estimated that some US$500 billion dollars of illegally ob-
tained funds is laundered throughout the world every year.14 As
a result of the recent international explosion in global money
laundering, countries such as India are attempting to develop
methods to control and eliminate money laundering.1 5
A. The Crime of Money Laundering
Money laundering is the process by which one disguises the
existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income in an
effort to make the funds appear legitimate.1 6 Money laundering
is an integral part of a drug operation, and as the lifeblood of
narcotics trafficking, money laundering allows for the use of
11. See INtAGo, supra note 7, at 2-4 (describing money laundering as crime that
transcends domestic and international boundaries).
12. See id. at 2 (describing international explosion of narcotics trafficking as single
most important catalyst to world's late awakening to money laundering). Although
money laundering activity has existed for years, government enacted relatively little leg-
islation to counter money laundering until recently. Id. at 3. For example, govern-
ments knew that the Sicilian Mafia and its U.S. counterparts amassed substantial profits
from their illegal activities, which they subsequently injected into the financial system.
Id. Governments failed to take action against money laundering until they witnessed
the effects upon society of the growing international narcotics trade. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Quirk, supra note 3, at 8 (estimating that US$500 billion of illegally ob-
tained funds enter the financial system every year). Id. Estimates vary as to exactly how
much money is laundered annually through financial system. The large variation in
estimates has resulted in reliance on consensus numbers. Id. On October 18, 1994, the
Financial Times released this "consensus number" which was based on recent estimates
by U.K. and U.S. officials. Id. The foundation of this number was not released. Id. The
estimate may have been derived from an informal updating and generalization of ear-
lier Financial Action Task Force micro-based estimates. Id.
15. See Record Number of Nations Battle Laundering, U.S. Says, MoNEY LAUNDERING
ALERT, May 1, 1993, at 1 (noting that in 1993 money laundering had become major
area of concern for Indian government, whereas it was not major concern three years
ago).
16. See Duncan E. Alford, Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: A Burden On Financial
Institutions, 19 N.C.J. INT'L & COM. REG. 437, 437 (1994) (offering definition of money
laundering); see also Nicholas Clark, The Impact of Recent Money Laundering Legislation on
Financial Intermediaries, 14 DIcKJ. INT'L L. 467, 469 (defining money laundering as "the
process by which the proceeds of crime or fraud are made to appear as if they have
emanated from a legitimate source.").
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funds generated through drug sales in the legitimate economy. 17
Without cleansing its profits, a narcotics operations would find it
difficult if not impossible to flourish." In an effort to counter
money laundering, many of countries have joined together in
international and regional efforts to effectively control money
laundering and eliminate drug trafficking.' 9 Several countries
have also developed their own domestic strategies aimed at
countering money laundering. 20
1. Background
While no two money laundering systems are the same, the
money laundering process essentially consists of three stages,
namely the placement of money, the layering of money, and the
integration of money.21 Placement refers to the physical dispo-
sal of illicitly obtained cash into a financial institution.22 The
layering of money refers to the movement of money through sev-
eral accounts or institutions in an effort to separate the money
from its illegal source. 23 Integration refers to the re-introduc-
tion of funds into the legitimate economy. 24
In the placement stage, the money launderer transforms il-
17. See Alford, supra note 16, at 437 (describing how money laundering is essential
component of drug trafficking operations).
18. See id. (discussing importance of money laundering to successful narcotics traf-
ficking operation). Money laundering is an integral part of criminal operations, be-
cause it hides the illegal source of criminal proceeds. Id. Money laundering provides
those involved with drug trafficking and other criminal activities with the ability to place
the proceeds of their crime into the financial system unnoticed. Id.
19. See Lee, supra note 7, at 200 (discussing success of intergovernmental regimes
at combating money laundering).
20. See Clark, supra note 16, at 470 (stating that only when country has sound anti-
money laundering policies in place will war against drugs be successful).
21. See id. at 470 (describing various stages of money laundering).
22. Id. The money laundering process is most susceptible to detection during the
placement stage when the money is first deposited into a bank or other financial institu-
tion. See Alford, supra note 16, at 439 (discussing how money laundering process is
particularly susceptible to detection during placement stage); see also Clark, supra note
16, at 470-71 (citing entry of cash into financial system as stage in typical laundering
process that is particularly susceptible to recognition). It is during this initial stage that
United States law enforcement officials have targeted their efforts by requiring financial
institutions to make currency transaction reports when cash is deposited. See, e.g. 31
U.S.C. § 5313 (imposing currency transaction reporting requirement upon financial
institutions for transactions in excess of US$10,000).
23. See Clark, supra note 16, at 470 (describing layering stage of money laundering
process).
24. Id.
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licit funds into more flexible and less suspicious forms.2 5 Once
transformed, the money launderer deposits the funds into a fi-
nancial institution. The money laundering process is particu-
larly vulnerable to recognition by law enforcement authorities
during the placement stage. 26 The largest hurdle faced by the
money launderer in this stage of the money laundering process
is the practical one of how to move the money into the layering
stage.27 Cognizant of the preference among money launderers
for depositing such large sums, those countries that have insti-
tuted anti-money laundering statutes have focused on requiring
banks and various deposit taking bodies to report unusual trans-
actions.28 Such statutes compel professional money launderers
to find alternative methods to introduce the funds into the
mainstream financial system. 29
As a result of continually evolving modern technology and
the ever increasing scope of global banking, the layering phase
of money laundering has proven to be far more resistant against
25. See Scott Sultzer, Note, Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to
Combat It, 63 TENN. L. Rxv. 143, 149 (1995) (discussing various techniques used by
money launderers during placement stage of money laundering process). During the
placement stage, money launderers often convert illicit proceeds into negotiable instru-
ments such as money orders or cashier's checks. Id. The ability to transform a large
quantity of cash into a smaller quantity of negotiable instruments renders the illicit
proceeds easier to smuggle. Id. Perhaps even more important, once the cash has been
converted into negotiable instruments, it can be readily deposited into the mainstream
financial system without setting off any alarms that money laundering enforcement
techniques are designed to detect. Id.
26. See Alford, supra note 16, at 439 (discussing difficulties faced by money laun-
derers during placement stage). The money laundering process is most vulnerable to
detection when the large sums of money derived from illicit activity are deposited into a
financial institution. Id. This is because law enforcement authorities require banks to
report transactions in excess of a certain amount when cash is deposited into a bank. Id.
27. See Sultzer, supra note 25, at 149 (stating that most convenient solution would
be to deposit money directly into bank, or other financial institution, and then reroute
funds through wire transfers).
28. See Clark, supra note 16, at 470-71 (stating that if all banks and financial institu-
tions are forced to report their suspicions to law enforcement authorities, money laun-
derer will find his task more difficult); see also European Community Council Directive
on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Launder-
ing, Council Directive 91/308, O.J.L 166/77 (1991) [hereinafter Council Directive]
(stating that "ensuring that credit and financial institutions examine with special atten-
tion any transaction which they regard as particularly likely, by its nature to be related
to money laundering is necessary in order to preserve the integrity and the soundness
of the financial system as well as contribute to combating this phenomenon.").
29. See Sultzer, supra note 25, at 149 (stating that no matter what avenue of place-
ment money launderer chooses, ultimate goal is to introduce funds so that their source
can be disguised through layering process).
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law enforcement efforts."0 Layering illicit funds is often accom-
plished through wire transferring funds through offshore bank-
ing havens such as Mauritius, Austria, and Hong Kong. 1 When
funds are placed in a country that has stringent bank secrecy
laws, the origin of the funds becomes extremely difficult to
trace.32
There are various other methods through which money
launderers can hide the origin of illicitly earned money.33 As
banks in several countries are compelled to report currency
transactions over a certain amount, money launderers often use
wire transfers to hide the source of funds.34 Real estate transac-
tions provide yet another method of repatriating illicitly earned
cash into the legitimate economy.3 5 Other methods include the
30. See Alford, supra note 16, at 439-40 (discussing various techniques used by
money launderer to hide illegal source of funds). Techniques used during the layering
stage include international wire transfers through offshore fictitious entities, and the
use of companies that are exempt from currency transaction reporting requirements.
Id. By depositing the illicit proceeds in an offshore entity, the funds often become
beyond the legal reach of the law enforcement authorities in the jurisdiction where the
activity giving rise to the money occurred. See Barry A. K. Rider, The Wages of Sin-
Taking the Profit Out of Corruption- a British Perspective, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 391, 400
(1995) (discussing benefits of moving proceeds of crime offshore). Even if the relevant
laws can be applied, involving another jurisdiction creates significant practical barriers
for investigators in securing evidence that would be admissible before a court. Id. The
use of counterbalancing loan schemes adds additional layers of complexity in the layer-
ing stage. See Sultzer, supra note 25, at 150 (defining counterbalancing loan scheme as
placing illicit funds in off-shore bank while using value of account as collateral for bank
loan in another country).
31. See New MLATs Extend U.S. Laundering Effort, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT,June 1,
1997, available in Westlaw, WL 9476403 (stating that U.S. has recently signed Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaties with Austria and Hong Kong, both of which are pending ratifi-
cation). When and if ratified, it is likely that wire transfers to these countries as a
method of layering funds will decrease. Id.
32. See Afford, supra note 16, at 441 (discussing use of financial institutions in
countries with strong bank secrecy laws as method of avoiding detection by law enforce-
ment authorities in other jurisdictions). Bank Secrecy laws generally preclude a bank
from providing information on a customer's account to anyone, including law enforce-
ment agencies, without the specific authorization of the client. Id.
33. See Afford, supra note 16, at 440 (observing that there are methods available to
money launderers to hide their identity as well as origin of illicit funds). One such
method includes the establishment of a trust, where only the bank knows of the
trustee's identity. Id.
34. See id. at 439-40 (stating that bank-to-bank transfers of legitimate funds are
virtually impossible to discern from transfers of illegal funds).
35. See id. (noting that real estate transactions and real estate developments repre-
sent method of repatriating funds from abroad).
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establishment of boutique banks36 and front companies.3"
There are also several mechanisms by which an individual
engaged in money laundering activity can disguise his identity. 8
A fairly common vehicle for money laundering operations is the
use of numbered accounts in certain foreign countries with strin-
gent bank secrecy policies.39 It is also possible for a depositor to
set up a trust,40 or what is known as a paper corporation41 which
issues bearer shares.42
Once sufficiently layered through a series of complex trans-
actions, the illegally obtained funds can be integrated into the
legitimate financial world.43 There are a number of ways in
which these funds can reenter the financial world.44 Once the
36. See id. (stating that boutique banks interact with larger commercial banks and
wire money through several accounts in order to avoid recognition by law enforcement
authorities); see also Patrick O'Brien, Tracking Narco Dollars: The Evolution of a Potent
Weapon in the Drug War, 21 INTER-AM. L.R. 637, 671 (1990) (discussing use of boutique
banks as method of laundering proceeds of drug trafficking).
37. See Afford, supra note 16, at 439-40 (stating that front companies used by
money launderers are often exempt from currency reporting requirements, and conse-
quently are able to take in large amounts of drug money). The use of companies ex-
empt from currency reporting requirements has enabled banks to become the unwit-
ting accomplices to money laundering. Id. Once the funds are taken in by a front
corporation, they are intermingled with funds from other legitimate business ventures.
Id. Once the drug proceeds are mixed with the legitimate funds, they are then placed
in financial institutions. Id.
38. See id. (discussing methods used by money launderers to hide their identity).
The concealment of a money launderer's identity provides yet another layer of com-
plexity, separating the funds from its illegal source. Id.
39. See id. (stating that in these jurisdictions, only form of contact that depositor
has with bank is through account manager). Furthermore, all communication between
the account manager and the depositor is conducted by reference to the account
number rather than a name. See id. (discussing use of numbered accounts as vehicle to
launder money).
40. See id. at 440 (noting that with trust, only bank is aware of trustee's identifica-
tion).
41. See id. (stating that with these paper corporations, only attorney that creates
corporation is aware of identity of shareholders).
42. See id. at 468 n.30 (defining bearer shares as shares of equity stock that are not
registered in shareholder's name, but rather, can be redeemed or sold by bearer with
no further owner identification). The benefit to bearer shares is anonymity. Id.
43. See IN-rmGo, supra note 7, at 10, (stating that integration stage is final macro
stage in money laundering process). The integration stage of the money laundering
process places the laundered proceeds of crime back into the economy in such a man-
ner as to make it appear as legitimate business earnings. Id.
44. See id. (describing various means of integrating proceeds of crime back into
economy). Real estate transactions represent the traditional means of redirecting ille-
gal proceeds into the economy. Id. Property can be bought by a shell corporation and
then sold. Id. Other methods of integration include the use of false invoices by import-
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funds are integrated back into the financial system, the money is
accessable from anywhere in the world, while the original source
of the funds remains unknown.45
Within India, the system of money laundering is further
complicated by the ancient underground form of banking
known as Hawala.46 Hawala, which means providing a code, was
established centuries before the financial systems of the West.47
Created as a means to facilitate the secure and convenient flow
of funds, the system has become increasingly popular over the
past few decades.4"
Under the present-day Hawala system, a person wishing to
transfer funds to another country deposits the money with a
Hawala dealer.49 The depositor also gives the dealer a code,5"
which must be given by anyone trying to access the funds.51
Through the use of corporate accounts, the dealer is able to
move the funds to one of the dealer's agents in another coun-
try.52 Armed with the code, the intended recipient of the money
is able to obtain it from the dealer's agent.5" With its lack of
governmental supervision, the Hawala system allows individuals
to make deposits and withdrawals through Hlawala dealers rather
than financial institutions.54
export companies, whereby overevaluation of entry documents enables a money laun-
derer to later justify additional funds deposited into a financial institution. Id.
45. See id. (stating that detection at integration stage is possible only through use
of undercover infiltration and informant assistance).
46. See Rider, supra note 30, at 404 (stating that in some societies, underground
banking systems rival conventional banking systems in terms of efficiency and capabil-
ity).
47. Ancient Underground Banking System, Hawala, Surfaces in U.S., MONEY LAUNDER-
ING ALERT, June 1, 1996, at 1 (defining term hawala as "providing a code").
48. Id. Merchant traders located abroad were the traditional system users. Id. A
merchant wishing to send money to his homeland would deposit the funds with a
Hawala banker, who most likely owned a trading business. Id. For a fee, the banker
would arrange for the money to be available for withdrawal from another banker, most
likely a trader, in another country. Id. Upon withdrawal, the two bankers would settle
their accounts through trade. Id.
49. Id.
50. See India Cash Market Tied to Burgeoning Scandal, C-i. TRIB., Jan. 21, 1996, at 14
(stating that codes can be as simple as "three pigs" or "five hens").
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Ancient Underground Banking System,.Hawala, Surfaces in U.S., supra note 48,
at 1 (stating that because Hawala system operates without any governmental supervi-
sion, it is believed to have become more appealing to money launderers).
54. Id.
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Traditionally, Indians living abroad used the Hawala system
to funnel money back to their families." As the Hawala system
avoids the use of traditional financial institutions, those who use
it are able to avoid fees charged by banks for wire transfers.56 In
recent years, however, the Hawala system has become increas-
ingly susceptible to the laundering of illicit funds.5 7 As anti-
money laundering legislation has proliferated around the world,
the unregulated Hawala system has become a more appealing
alternative for money launderers.5 8
Regardless of the type of financial intermediary that is used,
it is inevitable that a financial institution will be necessary for any
successful money laundering operation.59 It, therefore, seems al-
most inescapable that law enforcement authorities will focus on
financial institutions that are actively involved, albeit often unin-
tentionally, in money laundering.6 ° Authorities hope that if all
financial institutions are required to report their suspicions,
then potential money launderers will find the crime that much
harder to commit.
6 1
55. Id.
56. See Rider, supra note 30, at 404 (stating that efficiency of paperless and virtually
recordless banking system that is capable of transferring significant amounts of wealth
is an obvious attraction for money launderers).
57. See Ancient Underground Banking System, Hawala, Surfaces in U.S., supra note 48,
at 1 (discussing how increasing number of money launderers are using Hawala system
to launder illicit proceeds).
58. Id. The case of United States v. Singh illustrates the use of the Hawala system as
a means of laundering the proceeds of crime. United States v. Singh, No. 95 CR 152
(D. N.J. May 1995). The case revealed the establishment branches of the age-old sys-
tem, within the United States. See Ancient Underground Banking System, Hawala, Surfaces
in U.S., supra note 48, at 1 (discussing facts U.S. v. Singh). In United States v. Singh, two
Indian nationals were convicted of laundering over US$5 million of alleged drug
money to India. Id. After receiving the illicit funds, the Indian nationals would wire it
to Hong Kong and Singapore through corporate accounts. Id. Their counterparts in
those countries used the money to buy gold, which they smuggled into India. Id. Once
in India, they sold the gold at a profit. Id. The money was then distributed as directed
by the U.S. depositors. Id. The Indian nationals benefited from the fees charged for
their services as well as the profits made from the sale of the gold. Id.
59. See Clark, supra note 16, at 470 (stating that financial intermediary of some sort
is necessary component of successful money laundering operation).
60. See Alford, supra note 16, at 439 (stating that money laundering process is most
vulnerable to detection during placement stage when money is first deposited in finan-
cial institution).
61. See Clark, supra note 16, at 470 (noting that if governments require all financial
intermediaries to report all suspicious transactions, it will become increasingly difficult
to launder money). Law enforcement authorities have also decided to target financial
intermediaries because they have recognized that there are certain phases of money
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The rise in global money laundering has created an emerg-
ing criminal class6 2 who are uninvolved with the underlying
crimes that generate the illicit proceeds.6" This new class of
criminals consists of professional money launderers who aid and
abet criminals through financial activities.64 For these individu-
als, money laundering is a lucrative practice, whereby they can
earn proceeds ranging from anywhere between two and twenty
percent of the cash they launder.65 It is because of these inher-
ent dangers to the financial services sector that governments are
now targeting the financial industry.6 6 Many governments fear
that when credit and financial institutions are used to launder
the proceeds of crime, the stability of the system as well as con-
sumer confidence will systematically erode.6"
2. International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering
International regimes attempt to monitor or regulate cer-
tain international relations and activities.6" By establishing
laundering that are more vulnerable to detection. Id. These stages include cross the
entry of cash into the financial system, cross-border flows of cash, and wire transfers
within and from the financial system. Id. These stages cannot be conducted without
the use of a bank or other deposit taking body. Id. As a result, law enforcement officials
are placing a tremendous amount of pressure on financial intermediaries to report any
suspicious transactions. Id. The concern among law enforcement officials around the
world is that if the transactions are not detected at these critical points, they will go
undiscovered. Id. at 471.
62. See id. (observing that new class of criminals need not become involved with
underlying criminal activity beyond concealing and transferring proceeds that result
from it).
63. See id. (commenting on how money laundering is extremely lucrative criminal
enterprise in its own right).
64. See id. (stating that new class of criminals are individuals who are involved in
what society considers legitimate professions). They are bankers, accountants, lawyers,
and various other professionals with financial acumen. Id. There are tremendous ben-
efits to money launderers in using professionals who are bound by a code of ethic to
keep their dealings with clients confidential. See id. at 472 (discussing strength of privi-
lege that attaches to lawyer-client privilege).
65. Id.
66. See Alford, supra note 16, at 445 (stating that any association on part of banks
with criminal activity will undermine confidence in soundness and integrity of banking
system).
67. See Council Directive, supra note 28, O.J.L 166/77 (1991) (concluding that
where "credit and financial institutions are used to launder proceeds from criminal
activities ... the soundness and stability of the institution concerned and confidence in
the financial system as a whole could be seriously jeopardized, thereby losing the trust
of the public.").
68. See Bruce Zagaris & Sheila M. Castilla, Constructing an International Financial
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norms, rules, and procedures agreed to in order to regulate
money laundering, international regimes reduce the disparities
between divergent legal systems.6 9 Members of international
money laundering regimes obtain benefits through explicit or
tacit cooperation with each other.7v The United Nations Con-
vention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances71 is an example of an international effort that
established a new international legal regime for combatting
drug trafficking.7 2 In addition, intergovernmental groups such
as the Financial Action Task Force73 have created a general
framework for countries to follow in establishing an anti-money
laundering regime.7 1 Organizations such as the Basle Commit-
tee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices75 have
also aided in the international fight against money laundering
by providing a framework for financial institutions to follow. 76
Finally, international law enforcement organizations such as the
International Criminal Police Organization 77 have proven instru-
Enforcement Subregime: the Implementation of Anti-Money Laundering Policy, 19 BROOK J.
INT'L L. 871, 881 (1993) (discussing purpose of international regimes aimed at control-
ling money laundering).
69. See Lee, supra. note 7, at 200 (opining that intergovernmental regimes estab-
lished to deal with criminal activities have been minimizing disparities between diver-
gent legal systems).
70. See Zagaris & Castilla, supra note 68, at 881 (discussing benefits obtained by
members of international regimes).
71. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics and Psycho-
tropic Substances, supra note 4; see also INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS, supra note 7, at xi (stat-
ing that Convention represents major breakthrough in effort to address concerns in-
volved with international cooperation in drug money laundering cases).
72. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 387 (opining that recent adoption of U.N. Con-
vention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances constitutes sig-
nificant step by world community towards establishing effective law enforcement meas-
ures against international narcotics traffickers).
73. See Group of Seven Economic Declaration of 16July 1989, reprinted in INTERNA-
TIONAL EFFORTS, supra note 7, at 3.
74. See WILLIAM C. GILMORE, DIRTY MONEY THE EVOLUTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNTER MEASURES, 100 (1995) [hereinafter DIRTY MONEY] (stating that Financial Ac-
tion Task force has established minimal standards in fight against money laundering).
75. See Committee on Banking Regulations and supervisory practices, Basle Con-
cordat on Principles for the Supervision of Foreign Banks, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 7, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS AND SHORT TERM PROSPECTS, 29-32 (1981) [hereinafter the Basle Con-
cordat].
76. See INTRIAGO, supra note 7, at 29 (discussing development of Basle Committee
on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices).
77. See id. at 42 (stating that International Criminal Police Organization has been
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mental in combating money laundering by promoting mutual
legal assistance among law enforcement authorities around the
world.7
a. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
India's urgent need to control drug trafficking reflects
growing awareness within the international community that drug
trafficking and money laundering must be suppressed.79 The
United NatiOns ("U.N.") has played an integral role in the global
community's fight against illicit drug trafficking and money
laundering."0 In 1988, the U.N. passed the U.N. Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances ("Vienna Convention"). l Superseding the Single Con-
vention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961,82 the Vienna Convention is
an important new weapon against narcotics trafficking and
money laundering.8 " The Vienna Convention created interna-
tionally acknowledged drug trafficking offenses to be criminal-
ized under the domestic laws of signatory countries.8 4 Moreover,
the Vienna Convention has embraced a framework for interna-
tional cooperation that seeks to penalize drug traffickers as well
as those who accept drug trafficking proceeds.8 5
Under Article 3(1) (a) of the Vienna Convention, the U.N.
"key behind-the-scenes catalyst" in most international attempts to establish money laun-
dering controls).
78. Id.
79. See id. at 2 (attributing dramatic increase in international narcotics trafficking
as main catalyst for enactment of anti-money laundering statutes).
80. See DIRTY MONEY, supra note 74, at 61 (opining that United Nations' broad
mandate provided basis for creation of comprehensive and multifaceted strategy aimed
at combating drug trafficking and money laundering).
81. Vienna Convention, supra note 4; see also Stewart, supra note 4, at 388 (opining
that Vienna Convention is among most detailed and far-reaching instruments ever
adopted in field of international criminal law).
82. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, entered into force Dec. 13,
1964, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 151.
83. See Bruce Zagaris, Dollar Diplomacy: International Enforcement of Money Movement
and Related Matters- a United States Perspective, 22 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L. & ECON. 465, 523
(1989) (stating that Vienna Convention is sure to affect money movement in interna-
tional business transactions); see also INTERNATIONAL EFFoRTs, supra note 7, at xi (dis-
cussing how Vienna Convention has had substantial impact on subsequent interna-
tional initiatives directed at controlling money laundering).
84. See INTERNATIONAL EFFORTs, supra note 7, at xi (discussing accomplishments of
Vienna Convention).
85. See Vienna Convention, supra note 4, art. 3, 28 I.L.M. at 499-503.
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requests that its members to adopt a system of criminal offenses
under their domestic laws that address all facets of illicit drug
trafficking.86 Included among this provision's list of offenses are
matters such as the manufacture, distribution, or sale of illicit
drugs and the organization, management, or financing of illicit
trafficking activities.
Article 3(1) (b) of the Vienna Convention"8 specifically ad-
dresses the problem of money laundering, requiring all parties
to the agreement to formally establish money laundering as a
criminal offense." This provision also criminalizes the conver-
sion or transfer of property derived from drug related money
laundering, as well as the concealment or disguise of its true na-
ture or source.90 The obligation to establish these money laun-
dering related offenses is, however, subject to the constitutional
principles and legal systems of each member state.91
In addition, Article 5 of the Vienna Convention 92 requests
86. See Vienna Convention, supra note 4, art. 3(1)(a), 28 I.L.M. at 500-01. Article 3
of the Vienna Conference, hailed by several as the "cornerstone of the Convention,"
represents the end-product of detailed deliberations as to which specific elements
should be encompassed in an effective regime aimed at countering drug trafficking. See
International Efforts, supra note 7, at xi (discussing the importance of Article 3).
87. See Vienna Convention, supra note 4, art. 3(1)(a), 28 I.L.M. at 500-01. Article
3(1) (a) (i) prohibits:
The production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering, offering for
sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch,
dispatch in transit, transport, importation or exportation of any narcotic drug
or any psychotropic substance ..
Id.
88. Id., art. 3(1)(b), 28 I.L.M. at 501.
89. Id. Article 3(1)(b)(ii) prohibits:
The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition,
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such
property is derived from an offen[se] or offen[ses] established in accordance
with [Article 3(1) (a)]... or from an act of participation in such an offen[se]
or offen[ses].
Id.
90. Id. A substantial amount of the language in Article 3(1) (b) was derived from
the U.S. anti-money laundering laws, in particular 18 U.S.C. §§1956-57. See Stewart,
supra note 4, at 404 n.18 (noting similarities between U.S. anti-money laundering legis-
lation and Article 3(1) (b) of Vienna Convention).
91. See Vienna Convention, supra note 4, art. 3(1) (c), 28 I.L.M. at 500. This limita-
tion upon the requirements of Article 3(1) (b) is due largely to the difficulties encoun-
tered between the negotiators at the Vienna Conference in designing precise defini-
tions that were acceptable to differing legal systems. See David P. Stewart, supra note 4,
at 393 (discussing difficulties encountered by negotiators in agreeing upon precise defi-
nitions).
92. Vienna Convention, supra note 4, art. 5., 28 I.L.M. at 504.
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that members empower their courts and other relevant authori-
ties to freeze or seize the proceeds or converted property de-
rived from drug trafficking.93 This article further proposes that
signatories authorize their courts and other competent authori-
ties to order that bank, financial, or commercial records are
available to law enforcement authorities.94 Under this provision,
a party who fails to make such records available to law enforce-
ment authorities faces the penalty of seizure.95 The Vienna Con-
vention also calls for its members to afford one another the wid-
est measure of mutual legal assistance possible in investigations,
prosecutions, and judicial proceedings relating to drug traffick-
ing and money laundering offenses.96
b. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
Intergovernmental groups have also taken action against
the rising levels of global money laundering.97 The creation of
the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering ("FATF")
by the G-7 countries is yet another example of a globally orches-
93. Id., art. 5(4)(b), 28 I.L.M. at 504-05. Article 5(4)(b) provides that upon re-
quest by another party having jurisdiction over an offense established in accordance
with Article 3(1) that the requested party shall "take measures to identify, trace, and
freeze or seize proceeds, property instrumentalities . .. for the purpose of eventual
confiscation." Id.
94. Id. art. 5(3), 28 I.L.M. at 504. Under this provision, a party may not decline to
comply with this paragraph on the grounds of bank secrecy. Id. The inclusion of this
affirmative obligation has been characterized by many as a major breakthrough in anti-
money laundering legislation. See INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS, supra note 7, at xiii (noting
significance of Article 5(3)).
95. Vienna Convention, art. 5(3), supra note 4, 28 I.L.M. at 504.
96. Id. art. 7(1), 28 I.L.M. at 507. According to Article 7(1), mutual legal assist-
ance is to be provided for any of the following purposes: a) taking evidence or state-
ments from persons; b) effecting service of judicial documents; c) executing searches
and seizures; d) examining objects and sites; e) providing information and evidentiary
items; f) providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records, in-
cluding bank, financial, corporate or business records; and g) identifying or tracing
proceeds, property, instrumentalities or other things for evidentiary purposes. Id. at art.
7(2), 28 I.L.M. at 508. From the law enforcement perspective, perhaps the most signifi-
cant provision of the Vienna Convention can be found in Article 7(5) which prohibits
signatories from declining to provide mutual legal assistance on the grounds of bank
secrecy. Id. art. 7(5), 28 I.L.M. at 509. Thus, bank secrecy may not be used as ajustifica-
tion for refusing to provide legal assistance under the Vienna Convention or any of the
bilateral treaties affected by its provisions. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 399 (characteriz-
ing Article 7(5) as one of most significant provisions of Vienna conference, and exam-
ining likely effects of such provision).
97. See Lee, supra note 7, at 200-01 (describing intergovernmental anti-money
laundering regimes as establishing minimum standards for its members to adopt).
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trated effort to curb the occurrence of money laundering.9" The
FATF currently consists of twenty-six countries99 and two interna-
tional organizations. 00 The FATF is an intergovernmental or-
ganization whose purpose is to develop and promote policies to
counter money laundering.10 1
In an effort to create anti-money laundering policies that
cover all relevant aspects of money laundering, the FATF created
the Forty FATF Recommendations ("Recommendations").102
The Recommendations are measures that all member countries
of the FATF have agreed to implement, and that all other coun-
tries are encouraged to adopt.10 3 Designed to be universal in
application, the recommendations set forth a general framework
for anti-money laundering efforts.10 4
The Recommendations reflect the fact that different coun-
tries have diverse legal and financial systems and cannot imple-
ment identical measures. 10 5 The Recommendations constitute
principles for action in the area of money laundering prevention
which countries can tailor to their particular constitutional
frameworks.'0 6 This allows countries a degree of flexibility
98. See Alford, supra note 16, at 446 (discussing establishment of FATF). The G-7
countries created the FATF in the summit communiqu6 at the 1989 Economic Summit
held in Paris. Paris Economic Summit: Economic Declaration, July 16, 1989, reprinted in
28 I.L.M. 1293, 1299 (1989).
99. See The Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering, reprinted in 35 I.L.M 1291 (1996) [hereinafter Recommendations]. The
member countries of Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering ("FATF") are:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
the United Kingdom, and the United States). Id. at 35 I.L.M. 1291 n.1.
100. See id. at n.2 (stating that two International organizations that are members of
FATF are European Commission and Gulf Cooperation Council).
101. See 35 I.L.M. 1291 at introduction (stating purpose of FATF).
102. See Recommendations, supra note 99; see also DiRTY MONEY, supra note 74, at
100 (describing Recommendations as setting minimal standard in fight against money
laundering).
103. See id. (discussing flexible nature of Recommendations). As the Recommen-
dations represent minimal standards that members should adhere to, members may
institute more stringent standards if they so choose. Id.
104. See id. (stating that in recognition of fact that differences exist among legal
systems in various countries, Recommendations lay down general principles for coun-
tering money laundering rather than prescribing in great detail what ought to be
done).
105. Id.
106. See Recommendations, supra note 99, 35 I.L.M. 1291 at 1293.
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rather than stipulating every detail."' 7
c. Basle Committee Minimum Standards
The Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervi-
sory Practices0 8 ("Basle Committee") consists of officials from
the central banks and supervisory authorities of eleven major in-
dustrialized nations and Luxembourg. 10 9 In 1988, the Basle
Committee adopted a statement of principles that targeted
money laundering.1 Through the issuance of the Statement of
Principles, the Basle Committee sought to raise existing sub-par
banking regulations in order to meet the increasing risk of fi-
nancial crisis caused by the globalization of banking."1
The Basle Committee announced that banks should at-
tempt to find the true identity of their clients." 2 This principle
is commonly known as the know your customer rule." 3 The rule
gives money launderers less incentive to use banks because do-
mestic and international banks require information regarding a
customer's true identity and the nature of the funds being de-
107. Id.
108. See Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee Minimum Standards: International Regula-
toy Response to the Failure of BCCI, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 241, 247 (1992)
(discussing development of Basle Committee). The collapse of the Herstatt Bank in
Germany in 1974 led to the establishment of the Basle Committee on Banking Regula-
tions and Supervisory Practices ("Basle Committee") and the issuance of the Basle Con-
cordat, the Basle Committee's first agreement on bank supervision. Id.
109. See id., at 291 n.1 (listing the twelve nations involved in Basle Committee).
The Basle Committee consists of banking regulators from: Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
110. Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices Decem-
ber 1988 Statement on Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS, supra note 7, at 273-77 [hereinafter Statement of Principles];
see also INTRIAGO, supra note 7, at 29 (stating that statement of principles contained
recommendations aimed at preventing use of banks as "intermediaries for transfer or
deposit of funds derived from criminal activity.").
11. See Alford, supra note 16, at 444-45 (discussing fear on part of Basle Commit-
tee that if banks engaged in money laundering, public confidence in banking system
would erode).
112. See id. (discussing recommendations made by Basle Committee in its State-
ment of Principles regarding money laundering).
113. See id. at 445 (stating that Statement of Principles further suggested that
banks should explicitly state that they will refuse to conduct business with customers
lacking adequate identification). The "know your customer" rule further suggests that
when banks suspect that a deposit is the proceeds of criminal activity, they should take
appropriate measures. Id. Such measures include severing relations with the customer,
or freezing or closing the affected accounts. Id.
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posited.
114
In 1992, the Basle Committee issued new minimum stan-
dards115 ("New Minimum Standards") with respect to govern-
mental supervision and regulation of international banks." 6
The distinguishing elements of the New Minimum standards are
that all international banks and banking groups should receive
consolidated supervision by a home country regulator, l" 7 inter-
national banks should obtain the prior consent of both host and
home regulators before opening a branch or other banking es-
tablishment in a foreign country,"18 banking regulators should
have the right to collect information from international banks, if
a bank fails to meet the minimum standards, a host regulator
may impose sanctions against the bank, and information ex-
changes between banking regulators in different countries
114. See id. (noting that if banks require evidence of true identity of customers,
depositors of illicit proceeds will look elsewhere to launder their money).
115. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Minimum Standards for the
Supervision of International Banking Groups and Their Cross-Border Establishments
(June 1992) [hereinafter New Minimum Standards] (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal).
116. See Alford supra note 108, at 241 (analyzing formation of new minimum stan-
dards). The Basle Committee created the New Minimum Standards as a result of the
closure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International ("BCCI")onJuly 5, 1991. Id.
The closure of the US$20 billion bank represents one of the largest bank failures in
international banking history. Id. The immediate reason for the closure of BCCI was a
report received by the Bank of England, which was prepared by Price Waterhouse, de-
tailing massive fraud allegedly committed by senior officials at BCCI. Id. at 258. The
bank suffered tremendous losses. Id. In order to cover these losses, senior managers at
BCCI siphoned off deposits to cover these losses. Id. The report also stated that several
senior officials at BCCI made fictitious loans, failed to record deposits, and dealt in
their own shares in an effort to manufacture profits. Id. BCCI officials hid the losses
caused by fraudulent practices, bad trades, and unpaid loans by shifting assets between
subsidiaries. Id; see also All Things to All Men, ECONOMIST, July 27, 1991, at 67-68 (describ-
ing events leading to BCCI failure).
117. See New Minimum Standards, supra note 115, at 3. Consolidated supervision
requires the submission of reliable evidence regarding the global operations of the
particular international bank. Id. Under the New Minimum Standards, a home coun-
try regulator can prevent the establishment of banking operations in foreign jurisdic-
tions, if for example they are unsatisfied with the host county regulator's supervision of
foreign banks. Id.; see also Alford, supra note 108, at 267 (explaining concept of consoli-
dated supervision). In deciding whether to approve a foreign operation, the host coun-
try regulator may assess the bank's strength of capital, organization, and operating pro-
cedures for risk management. See New Minimum Standards, supra note 115, at 4.
118. See New Minimum Standards, supra note 115, at 4; see also Alford, supra note
108, at 270 (stating that most important change provided in New Minimum Standards is
formalization of principle that international bank must receive approval of both home
and host regulators before it can establish foreign banking operation).
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should continue to be encouraged. 1 9
Albeit a vast improvement in the area of bank regulation, 2 °
the New Minimum Standards contain gaps that banks could ex-
ploit in an effort to escape regulation.' 21 One such weakness is
the fact that the standards target the creation new branches, but
do not explicitly apply to existing branches. 122
Moreover, the New Minimum Standards are not a treaty and
consequently lack the force of law.12' As a result, the Basle Com-
mittee must rely on regulators' moral authority and informal
pressure to enforce the standards.2 4 Finally, the New Minimum
Standards encourage countries to implement standards inde-
pendently, thus making it difficult for continuity to develop
among nations.
125
119. See New Minimum Standards, supra note 115, at 1; see also Alford, supra note
108, at 266-67 (explaining objectives of new minimum standards).
120. See Afford, supra note 108, at 271 (stating that New Minimum Standards rep-
resent improvement in area of international banking regulation).
121. Id. at 270-74 (discussing weaknesses of New Minimum Standards). Under the
New Minimum Standards, a host country regulator is only required to institute restric-
tions which it deems are "necessary and appropriate" on a financial institution. Id. at
271. For example, a host regulator can choose to permit a foreign banking institution
to operate in the country in spite of the home country regulator's non-compliance with
the Minimum Standards. Id.
122. Id. While such standards may be useful in preventing the entry of an unsuita-
ble new financial institution into the international banking industry, a bank that is
likely to collapse may in fact already be in operation. Id. The New Minimum Standards
may not adequately police the activity of existing financial institutions. Id. Without an
explicit statement regarding the scope of application, retroactive application of the
New Minimum Standards will differ from county to country. Id. The New Minimum
Standards, however, do actively encourage the flow of information among bank regula-
tors. Id. They are structured in such a manner as to increase cooperation between
home-country and host-country regulators. Id. Their successful implementation could
serve as an early warning system which could determine problematic banks more
quickly. Id.
123. Id. at 272.
124. See id. (discussing weaknesses of New Minimum Standards with respect to vol-
untary compliance). Not only do the New Minimum Standards lack the force of law,
but also, they do not affect entire segments of the international banking community. Id.
The Basle. Committee represents banking regulators from only 12 countries. Id. at 241
n.1. The New minimum standards apply only to those countries. Id. Thus the New
minimum Standards do not govern a significant portion of the world's banking assets.
Id. at 273.
125. Id. at 272. The problems of voluntary compliance allow for discrepancies as
to enforcement techniques among nations. Id. For example, penalties for a violation
banking laws or regulations which are structured on the standards will be determined
by individual nations. Id. As a result, sanctions in certain nations may be more severe
than in others. Id.
The potential advantages of the standards are further complicated by the fact that
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d. Interpol
International organizations aimed at combating global
crimes now also play a larger role in drug and money laundering
enforcement. 126  National governments often fail to compre-
hend or appreciate the role played by international organiza-
tions in the enforcement of money movement. 127 This lack of
understanding results, in part, from the fact that the political
rewards for developing a framework for international coopera-
tion with respect to criminal activity are few. 128 Domestic gov-
ernments have also avoided the work of international criminal
organizations because of a widely held misperception that such
organizations attempt to undermine governmental enforcement
mechanisms. 129 Recently, however, several governments have
come to appreciate the need for building a strong global frame-
work in combating money laundering and other financial
crimes. 13 ° This awareness has resulted in a proliferation of legis-
lation, supporting strengthened multilateral cooperation.'
The International Criminal Police Organization 1 2 ("In-
implementation of the standards -may require that certain nations alter their domestic
laws. Id. Although the standards encourage the free flow of information between regu-
lators in one country to those in another, stringent bank secrecy laws in certain coun-
tries may prevent such an exchange. Id. •
126. See Zagaris, supra note 83, at 526 (noting that intergovernmental organiza-
tions play active role in establishing framework for international cooperation through
drafting of principles and conventions).
127. See id. (stating that domestic governments and legal practitioners rarely ap-
preciate role played by international organizations in enforcing money movement regu-
lations).
128. See id. at 526-27 (opining that rather than drafting principles and organizing
conferences devoted to international criminal cooperation, politicians, and constitu-
ents often focus on domestic activities, particularly those that result in large seizures or
sensational prosecutions).
129. See id. (explaining reasons why national governments have traditionally es-
chewed work of international organizations).
130. See id. (stating that it appears that domestic governments are beginning to
recognize importance of regional and international organizations in dealing with
money laundering). As a result, international organizations dealing with enforcement
no longer prefer secrecy and now allocate more resources to informing the public of
their activities. Id. These organizations now realize the importance of public relations
to their survival and growth. Id.
131. Id.; see e.g., Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Public Law No. 100-690, § 4701, 102
Stat 4181 (supporting establishment of International Currency Control Agency and call-
ing for enhanced multilateral cooperation in order to counter money laundering).
132. See INTRIAGO, supra note 7, at 42 (opining that International Criminal Police
Organization ("Interpol") has been one most effective protagonists of strong money
laundering controls and legislation). Since 1972, Interpol has actively advocated the
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terpol") is an international organization that promotes mutual
assistance among criminal police authorities around the
world.13 Established in 1923, Interpol has continued to grow
over the years and now has a membership of 177 member coun-
tries."' Through its expanded membership and vast resources,
Interpol has increased its activities to effectively combat the
crime of money laundering. 135 In recent years, Interpol has
proven instrumental in combating money laundering in areas
such as the Caribbean and Latin America.136
Interpol provides training and technical assistance to law
enforcement officials, in order to better educate them about
money laundering. 1 7 Its current initiatives in this area include
the development of a new criminal information system which
will include increased information on topics such as money laun-
dering and other financial crimes. 3 ' Interpol plans to link all
177 member countries to the criminal information system, giv-
efficacy of tracing and confiscating the proceeds of crime as an effective method of
controlling profited-motivated crime. Id.
133. Id. Interpol has its international headquarters in Lyons, France. Id. at 43. In-
terpol consists of representatives of law enforcement agencies from every country that is
a member of the organization. Id.
134. See C.T. Mahabharat, India Hooks into Interpol, NEWSBYrEs NEWS NETWORK,
Mar. 24, 1997, available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 10170139 (stating that as of March 1997,
177 countries belonged to Interpol).
135. See Zagaris, supra note 83, at 527-38 (discussing Interpol's accomplishments
in orchestrating international efforts to control money laundering).
136. See id. at 528-30 (discussing Interpol's accomplishments in combating money
laundering in the Caribbean and Latin America). At the Eleventh American Regional
Conference in Panama City, held in April 1987, Interpol adopted a resolution to estab-
lish police training seminars on financial investigations in the Caribbean and Latin
America. See id. (discussing Eleventh American Regional Conference). Interpol's Car-
ibbean and Latin America working groups have successfully drafted model legislation
on money laundering, which provides local law enforcement authorities access to finan-
cial records in investigations and prosecutions indictable offenses. See A Law to Facilitate
the Obtaining of Evidence Required in and For the Purpose of Criminal Investigations and for the
Purpose of Forfeiting the Proceeds of Crimes [hereinafter Interpol Model Legislation] (on file
with Fordham International Law Journal). The Interpol Model Legislation had a signifi-
cant impact on the U.N. Convention. See U.N. Report of the Secretary General on Implementa-
tion and Development of International Instruments on the Control of Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/1987/2 (1986).
137. See Zagaris, supra note 83, at 528 (stating that Interpol has been instrumental
in providing technical assistance and training to combat money laundering).
138. See Mahabharat, supra note 135 (stating that new criminal information system
will enable national law enforcement agencies to access all information maintained in
database maintained at Interpol headquarters in Lyons, France). The Central Bureau
of Investigation ("CBI") in India also plans to build its own national database which will
connect all branches of the CBI and thereby facilitate the exchange of information
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ing member countries greater access to information than they
may be able to obtain through nationally maintained
databases.' 39
Interpol's thirteen member executive committee, to which
India is a member, recently decided to undertake a special study
dedicated to money laundering in Asia.140  Known as
Asiawatch,"' the study will place a strong emphasis on money
laundering in the Indian subcontinent. 14 2 The study will also in-
clude a detailed look at commercial and trade activities that may
be closely linked with money laundering. 43 In addition, the
Criminal Funds Investigation Group1 4 4 ("FOPAC") at Interpol
also intends to launch a year long study on Hawala the under-
ground banking system that has been in place in India for centu-
ries. 14' FOPAC hopes that by tracing the funds derived from
criminal activities such as drug trafficking, it may be able to bet-
ter identify the heads of organized crime groups and drug
rings.
146
between different branches. Id. The proposed database will contain information about
all current as well as past criminal investigation undertaken by the CBI. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Vinay Kumar, Focus on Money Laundering in Asia, THE HINDU, Sept. 19,
1997 available in Westlaw, WL 14058349 (discussing Interpol's intentions further assess
problem of money laundering in Asian countries).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See IrIAc.o, supra note 7 at 42 (discussing creation of Criminal Funds Inves-
tigation Group). Interpol created the Fonds Provenant d'Activites Criminelles
("FOPAC") in 1983 to investigate the financial assets of organized crime. See Zagaris,
supra note 81, at 552 n.31. (discussing reasons for establishing FOPAC). FOPAC's re-
sponsibilities include studying existing, and developing new, mechanisms for the gath-
ering of financial information connected with, arising from, related to, or resulting
from narcotics transactions and other crimes; developing proposals for the sharing of
such financial information between countries for the use by, among others, their re-
spective law enforcement authorities; and developing a proposal and implementation
plan for creating, within an appropriate international body, a clearing-house for the
receipt, coordination and execution of requests for such information. See ICPO-In-
terpol General Assembly Resolution on Money Laundering and Related Matters, AGN/
58/RES/4 (Nov. 1989) reprinted in INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS, supra note 7, at 278.
"Fonds Provenant d'Activites Criminelles" means "funds derived from criminal activi-
ties." See Zagaris, supra note 83, at 552 n.431 (providing English translation of Fonds
Provenant d'Activites Criminelles).
145. See Kumar, supra note 140 (stating that FOPAC intends to study Hawala sys-
tem in order to develop recommendations for combatting money laundering that oc-
curs through underground banking system).
146. Id. FOPAC was able to identify and arrest 12 individuals in a large scale
money laundering operation in Kiev last year as a result of the increased cooperation
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3. Selected Regional Anti-Money Laundering Regimes
Beyond the internationally orchestrated efforts at combat-
ing money laundering, several regional anti-money laundering
efforts have burgeoned over the years.147 These regional re-
gimes tend to concentrate on the similarities between the cul-
tures, traditions and legal systems of its member states. 1 48 In ad-
dition, these regional anti-money laundering regimes have facili-
tated the convergence of international attempts to counter
money laundering.1 49 The Organization of American States 150
("OAS") is an example of a regional organization that has taken
important steps towards eliminating money laundering in Latin
America and the Caribbean. 5 ' The European Union 152 has also
taken significant steps towards the elimination of money laun-
dering in Europe.1 3
a. Organization of American States
The OAS is a multinational organization that is dedicated to
between the European Liaison office of Interpol and the authorities of Belgium and the
Ukraine. Id.
147. See Lee, supra note 7, at 204 (discussing importance of regional anti-money
laundering regimes in effectively controlling crime of money laundering).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Lee, supra note 7, at 243 n.60 (discussing creation of OAS). The OAS was
created in 1948 after the ninth Pan-American Conference. Id. The Purpose of the OAS
is to increase security in the Western Hemisphere, to settle controversies between mem-
bers, and to encourage the cooperation of economy, culture, and society within the
member states. See Charter of Organization of American States, arts. I & IV, T.I.A.S. No.
2361; see also YEARBOOK OF INT'L ORGANIZATION, (Union of Int'l Organization ed., 1995/
96) (stating primary goals of OAS). As of 1995, the OAS had thirty-five members includ-
ing Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba (participation was suspended in 1962),
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, the
United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See THE WORLD FAcTBOOK 507 app. C (1995).
151. See INTruAo, supra note 7, at 38-42 (discussing accomplishments of Organiza-
tion of American States ("OAS") in combating money laundering).
152. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 (amending Treaty Establishing European Economic Com-
munity, Mar. 25, 1857, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (CMD. 5179-II), as
amended by Single European Act. O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741, in TREA-
TIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC OWl Pub. Off. 1987)).
153. See INTRiAGo, supra note 7, at 31-38 (describing actions taken by European
Union to combat money laundering and reduce levels of drug trafficking in Europe).
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the development and preservation of peace in the Americas. a54
Actively supported by the G-7 countries, the OAS encourages its
signatories to embrace the standards of the 1988 United Nations
Convention and the Recommendations as models upon which
they can base their own anti-money laundering legislation. 5'
The OAS established the Inter-American Drug Abuse Con-
trol Commission'56 ("CIDAD") in order to draft a number of
regulations and administrative recommendations dealing with
money laundering control and asset forfeiture of the proceeds of
drug trafficking in OAS countries. 157 In March 1992, CIDAD ex-
amined and approved the Model Regulations Concerning Laun-
dering Offenses Connected to Illicit Drug Trafficking and Re-
lated Offenses ("OAS Laundering Regulations") .15' The OAS
Laundering Regulations are designed to complement Latin
American civil and common law legal regimes.'
59
The OAS Laundering Regulations define money laundering
related activities, formally establish money laundering as a
crime, and call for the seizure of property and proceeds both
154. See INTRIAGO, supra note 7, at 38 (stating that most experts believe that cause
of global money laundering problem is in Western Hemisphere and that without atten-
tion to problem there, no solution can be found).
155. Id.
156. SeeJerez, supra note 7, at 344 n.102. (noting that CIDAD is abbreviation for
Commission Interamericana Para el Control del Abuso de Drogas (Inter-American
Drug Abuse Commission)). CIDAD is an "autonomous regional organization" within
the OAS. Id. To draft the regulations, CIDAD gathered a group of experts from thir-
teen of the participating countries. See INTRIAGO, supra note 7, at 39 (discussing efforts
made by CIDAD at drafting regulations and administrative recommendations regarding
money laundering control and asset forfeiture). The Group of experts met several
times during 1990 and 1991 to draft the regulations. Id. In March 1991, the group of
experts completed the process of drafting the regulations and passed them on to the
OAS member states for approval. Id.
157. Id.
158. See OAS Laundering Regulations, supra note 7; see also Declaration and Pro-
gram of Action of Ixtapa, OEA/ser.K/XXVIII.2.1, RM/NARCO/doc. 29/90 (1990), re-
printed in INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS, supra note 7, at 290. The Model Regulations were
actually first conceived of at the Inter-American Meeting of Ministers in Ixtapa Mexico
in 1990. Id. The OAS representatives recommended that an Inter-American group of
experts draft model legislation that would conform with the 1988 United Nations Con-
vention. SeeJerez, supra note 7, at 344-45 (discussing impetus behind creation of OAS
Laundering Regulations). They further suggested that the model regulations, once
drafted, be sent to the United Nations General Assembly for Consideration by the Ex-
pert Group on Money Laundering. Id. at 345.
159. See id. (noting that OAS Laundering Regulations complement civil and legal
conditions that are specific to Latin American countries).
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within and outside the region. 160 In addition, the OAS Launder-
ing Regulations also require that signatory countries relax any
existing stringent bank secrecy laws.161 Furthermore, the OAS
Laundering Regulations also provide detailed techniques for co-
operation among international institutions in enforcing foreign
judgments.1 62
The OAS Laundering Regulations are a statutory model
structured to enable the adoption of anti-money laundering leg-
islation.163 They permit countries, lacking the resources and
requisite legal infrastructure, to develop their own legislation. 164
Like the Basle Committee's New Minimum Standards, however,
the OAS Laundering Regulations are not a treaty.1 65 As such,
they do not have the necessary force of law.166 Consequently,
the success of such anti-money laundering strategies is contin-
gent upon whether the individual signatories adopt the regula-
tions domestically.16
b. European Union
Europe is an area of the world that is extremely concerned
with the growing money laundering problem. 168 This concern is
160. See INTRIAGO, supra note 7, at 40 (discussing provisions of OAS Laundering
Regulations). According to the OAS Laundering Regulations, a crime is committed
whenever anyone "transfers, converts, acquires, possesses, uses, and conceals or dis-
guises the nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights, or ownership of
property that he or she knows or should have known is the proceeds of an illicit traffic
offense or an offense related thereto." Id.
161. See Lisa Barbot, Note, Money Laundering: an International Challenge, 3 TUL. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 161, 176 (1994) (stating that OAS Laundering Regulations also apply
to virtually all types of financial institutions).
162. See INrruAGo, supra note 7, at 42 (observing that OAS Laundering Regulations
suggest detailed steps for activating multilateral cooperation including that which per-
tains to foreign judgments in courts of another country).
163. SeeJerez, supra note 7, at 348 (discussing how there is no mandatory compli-
ance requirement with OAS Laundering Regulations for signatories); See also Phyllis
Solomon, Note, Are Money Launderers All Washed Up in the Western Hemisphere? The OAS
Model Regulations, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COmP. L. REv. 433, 453 (1992) (stating that OAS
Laundering Regulations are only suggested framework for anti-money laundering legis-
lation).
164. SeeJerez, supra note 7, at 348 (discussing how Latin American countries bene-
fit from OAS Laundering Regulations).
165. See id. (explaining weaknesses of OAS Laundering Regulations).
166. Id.
167. See Zagaris & Castilla, supra note 68, at 906 (stating that it is likely that OAS
Laundering Regulations will be emulated by member states).
168. See INrIUAGo, supra note 7, at 30 (opining that that "there is probably no area
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largely due the fact that number of drug-related deaths in Eu-
rope increased dramatically over the past few years.1 69 In addi-
tion, Member States of the European Union fear that the elimi-
nation of restraints on capital movement between countries will
facilitate money laundering activities. 170 Because of the very real
dangers posed to the European Union by the rise in global
money laundering, the European Union has become one of the
leaders in the international movement against money launder-
ing.171 Through initiatives such as the Council of Europe Con-
vention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of Pro-
ceeds from Crime, 172 ("Council of Europe Convention") and
Council Directive 91/308/EEC on the Prevention of the Use of
the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering,171
("Council Directive") the European Union has made significant
advances in building an effective regional anti-money launder-
ing regime. 174
i. Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation from Proceeds of Crime
The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search,
Seizure and Confiscation of Proceeds from Crime 175 represents a
major effort by the EU Member States to combat the escalating
problem of money laundering. 7 6 Whereas the UN Convention
focuses on money laundering only as it is connected with narcot-
ics trafficking, the Council of Europe Convention criminalizes
money laundering as it relates to a broad range of illicit activi-
of the world more apprehensive about growing drug menace and money laundering
activities it drives than Europe, both east and west.").
169. See id. (stating that Europe is now experiencing rude awakening to magnitude
and effects of global narcotics trafficking).
170. See INTRIAGO, supra note 7, at 31 (discussing fear that removal of trade and
other economic barriers may facilitate money laundering).
171. See id. (citing the European Union as one of leaders in international move-
ment to combat money laundering).
172. Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confisca-
tion of Proceeds from Crime, Sept. 12, 1990, Europ. T.S. No. 141, reprinted in 30 I.L.M.
148 (1991) [hereinafter Council of Europe Convention].
173. Council Directive, supra note 28, O.J.L 166/77 (1991).
174. See INTRIAGO, supra note 7 at 30-38 (discussing steps taken by European
Union to counter global money laundering).
175. Council of Europe Convention, supra note 172.
176. See DiRTY MONEY, supra note 74, at 137 (describing Council of Europe Con-
vention as "important and innovative" tool in global anti-money laundering campaign).
1998] INDIA'S HEROIN TRADE 2039
ties.1 77 The Council of Europe Convention seeks to promote in-
ternational cooperation with respect to the prevention of all seri-
ous crimes and offenses which generate large profits.
178
The Council of Europe Convention requires parties to im-
plement legislation that will enable domestic law enforcement
authorities to confiscate the proceeds from crime. 179 Further-
more, the Council of Europe Convention requires signatories to
enact legislation that criminalizes the knowing conversion or
transfer of proceeds from crime, or assisting a person in such
conversion or transfer, 180 the knowing concealment or disguise
of the nature, source location, movement or ownership of such
property,"8 ' acquisition, possession or use of such illicitly gained
proceeds,182 and participation in, facilitation of, counseling of or
conspiracy to commit or attempt to commit the above of-
fenses.'83 The Council of Europe Convention also requires its
signatories to cooperate and assist each other in investigations,
as well as to share information about illicitly gained property
with each other.'84
While the Council of Europe Convention prescribes a tre-
mendous amount of cooperation and assistance among its mem-
bers, it has its limitations.185 For example, signatories are not
177. Explanatory Report on the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime [hereinafter Explanatory Report], reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS, supra note 7, at 192; see also Barbot, supra note 161, at 177-78
(explaining how Council of Europe Convention expands range or criminal activities
considered under category of money laundering).
178. See Explanatory lgeport, supra note 177, at 193 (stating that one of purposes
of Council of Europe Convention is "to facilitate international cooperation as regards
investigative assistance, search, seizure and confiscation of proceeds from all types of
criminality, especially serious crimes, and in particular drug offences, arms dealing, ter-
rorist offences trafficking in children and young women... and other offences which
generate large profits.").
179. Council of Europe Convention, supra note 172, art. 2(1), 30 I.L.M. at 151.
Member nation may, however, limit this articles scope of application to certain types of
offenses. Id. art. 2(2), 30 I.L.M. at 151.
180. Id. art. 6(1)(a), 30 I.L.M. at 152.
181. Id. art. 6(1)(b), 30 I.L.M. at 152.
182. Id. art. 6(1)(c), 30 I.L.M. at 152.
183. Id. art. 6(1)(d), 30 I.L.M. at 152.
184. Id. arts. 7, 8, 13, 30 I.L.M. at 153, 154. The EC Convention also requires that
signatories, at the request of another party who has instituted criminal proceedings, to
take the necessary provisional measures, such as freezing or seizing assets, in order to
prevent the transfer of disposal of such property. Id. art. 11, 30 I.L.M. at 153-54.
185. See Barbot, supra note 161, at 179 (discussing gaps in Council of Europe Con-
vention).
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required to criminalize the act of money laundering if in doing
so, it would be acting contrary to the basic tenets of its legal sys-
tem or constitution. 116 It is important to note, however, that
where the enactment of anti-money laundering legislation would
not undermine basic constitutional principles, countries are ob-
ligated to impose such legislation.187
ii. Council Directive 91/308/EEC, On Prevention of the Use
of the Financial System for the Purpose of
Money Laundering
Council Directive 91/308/EEC, On Prevention of the Use
of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering,"'
represents a yet another international effort at combating
money laundering.189 Under the Council Directive, the burden
of detecting money launderers is placed upon the financial insti-
tutions.1 90 Cognizant of the danger that money laundering
poses to the soundness and stability of financial institutions, the
drafters of the Council Directive sought to combat money laun-
dering through international cooperation and coordination. 91
Like the Council of Europe Convention, the Council Directive
criminalizes money laundering as it relates to all criminal activ-
ity, rather than just narcotics trafficking.19 2
Similar to other internationally orchestrated efforts aimed
186. See Council of Europe Convention, supra note 172, art. 6, 30 I.L.M. at 152. In
addition, the EC Convention permits a country to postpone or refuse to cooperate if
the proposed cooperation would jeopardize sovereignty or security of a party or if the
request for cooperation would amount to a political or fiscal offense in that country. Id.
art. 18, 30 I.L.M. at 155-56.
187. See Explanatory Report, supra note 177, at 196 (stating that one of principal
purposes of Council of Europe Convention is to provide instrument obliging states to
adopt efficient measures in their national laws to combat serious crime and to deprive
criminals of fruits of their illicit activities).
188. Council Directive, supra note 28, O.J.L 166/77 (1991).
189. See INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS, supra note 7, at xviii (stating that primary objec-
tive of Council Directive is one of preventing abuse of financial system and detecting
money laundering, as opposed to enhancing international cooperation regarding pun-
ishment of offenders and confiscation of proceeds of their crimes).
190. See Council Directive, supra note 28, pmbl, OJ. L 166/77, at 77 (1991) (stat-
ing that financial institutions are an effective tool in anti-money laundering efforts).
191. Id.
192. Id. The Council Directive uses the definition of money laundering adopted
by the Vienna Convention. Id., art. 1, O.J. L 166/77, at 79 (1991). Because money
laundering occurs in relation other forms of criminal activity, such as organized crime
and terrorism, it directs member states to extend the effects of the Directive to include
the proceeds of such activities. Id.
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at controlling money laundering, the Council Directive offers
Member States a tremendous amount of flexibility with respect
to enacting legislation.1 93 The Council Directive permits each
Member State to determine the penalties to be imposed upon
those charged with money laundering.'9 4
The Council Directive follows the recommendations of the
Basle Committee, in that they require Member States to impose
know-your-customer rules upon credit and financial institu-
tions.'95 The identification requirement automatically applies to
any transactions which exceed 15,000 ECU, whether the transac-
tion is carried out in a single operation, or in several operations
which seem to be linked.' 96 In addition the Council Directive
requires countries to ensure that financial institutions report any
suspicious transactions to law enforcement authorities.'97
Similar to other regional efforts aimed at controlling money
laundering,19 there are limits to the effectiveness of the Council
193. See id., art. 15, O.J. L 166/77 at 81 (1991) (enabling Member States to adopt
or retain in force stricter provisions to counter money laundering than those provided
in Council Directive).
194. Id., art. 14, O.J. L 166/77, at 81 (1991).
195. Id. art 3(1), OJ. L 166/77, at 79 (1991). The Council Directive defines credit
institution as "an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable
funds from the public and to grant credits for its own accounts." Id., art. 1, OJ. L 166/
77, at 79(1991). It also includes branch offices, located within the European Commu-
nity, of foreign credit institutions. Id.
The Directive defines "financial institution" as:
an undertaking other than a credit institution whose principal activity is to
carry out one or more of the following operations: 1) acceptance of deposits
and other repayable funds from the public; 2) lending; 3) financial leasing; 4)
money transmission services; 5) issuing and administering means of payment;
6) guarantees and commitments; 7) trading for its own account or for the
accounts of customers in money market instruments; foreign exchange; finan-
cial futures and options; exchange and interest rate instruments; or transfera-
ble securities; 8) participation in share issues and the provisions of services
related to such issues; 9) advice to undertakings on capital structure industrial
strategy and related questions and advice and services relating to mergers and
the purchase of undertakings; 10) money brokering; 11) portfolio manage-
ment and advice; 12) safekeeping and administration of securities; 13) credit
reference services; and 14) safe custody services.
Id. art. 1, O.J. L 166/77, at 79 (1991).
196. Id., art. 3(2), O.J. L 166/77, at 79 (1991).
197. Id., art. 3(6), O.J. L 166/77, at 80 (1991). Under the Council Directive, finan-
cial institutions are required to report all suspicious transactions regardless of whether
they exceed the ECU 15,000 threshold. Id.
198. See, e.g., OAS Laundering Regulations, supra note 7.
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Directive.' 99 There are gaps in the Council Directive that may
enable a money launderer to circumvent its rigorous applica-
tions.20 0 For example, Article 3 provides that credit and finan-
cial institutions shall not be subject to the identification require-
ment where the customer is also a credit or financial institution
covered by the Council Directive.2 ' This exception, enables a
money launderer who has successfully deposited illicit funds to
remain undetected. 20 2
4. Selected National Regimes
National anti-money laundering regimes represent the most
basic level of anti-money laundering efforts in the international
campaign against money laundering. 203  International and re-
gional drug regimes generally require signatory countries to es-
tablish criminal offenses and penalties for drug-related crimes
under their domestic laws.204 Thus, the success of international
and regional efforts at combatting money laundering depends
upon the implementation if sound domestic anti-money laun-
dering legislation. 2 5 The United States serves as an example of
a country that has had significant experience in enacting anti-
money laundering legislation. 20 6 The United Kingdom has also
had a great deal of success in enacting anti-money laundering
legislation. 20 7
a. The United States
The United States is an example of a country with a compre-
199. See Alford, supra note 16, at 451-52 (discussing gaps in Council Directive).
200. Id.
201. See id. (noting that failure to impose identification requirement on bank-to-
bank transactions creates possible loophole for money launderers, enabling them to
launder funds through interbank transfers).
202. Id.
203. See Lee, supra note 7, at 205-06 (stating that national regime is "the basic
combat unit against domestic and international drug problems.").
204. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 4, art. 3(1) (b), 28 I.L.M. at 501 (re-
quiring member states to formally establish money laundering as criminal offense).
205. See Lee, supra note 7, at 206 (stating that only when national strategy is sound
will international war against drugs and money laundering be successful).
206. See INTRIAGO, supra note 7, at 46 (naming United States as founder of money
laundering controls).
207. See Zagaris & Castilla, supra note 68, at 934 (opining that England has led
Europe in enacting anti-money laundering laws and to date has comprehensive and
extensive legislation in place for combatting money laundering).
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hensive anti-money laundering regime.208 The impetus for en-
acting U.S. anti-money laundering legislation was the need to
control the growing narcotics trafficking problem in the United
States. 209 Through the Bank Secrecy Act 210 ("BSA"), the U.S.
government sought to prevent the use of the U.S. banking sys-
tem as a depository for the proceeds of the drug trafficking. 11
The BSA established currency reporting requirements for all do-
mestic financial institutions. 12 In addition, the BSA requires
U.S. citizens conducting business outside of the United States to
maintain records as to the identity of interested parties as well as
detailed descriptions of all transactions exceeding the congres-
sionally established threshold of US$10,000. 213
As the loopholes in the BSA became apparent, Congress
took further action to control the increasingly prevalent crime of
money laundering.21 4 Cognizant of the low levels of compliance
208. See Alford, supra note 16, at 456 (stating that in 1980s, United States led world
in enacting comprehensive legislation to combat money laundering). Anti-money laun-
dering initiatives in the United States developed as early as 1970. See e.g., Bank Secrecy
Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 114 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5314,
5316-5324). As the drug trade in the United States burgeoned, so did the use of the
U.S. banking system as a means of depositing illicit funds into the financial system. See
Sultzer, supra note 25, at 156 (discussing background behind enactment of Bank Se-
crecy Act). The congressional response to this mounting phenomenon culminated in
the enactment of the Bank Secrecy Act. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat.
114 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§5311-5314, 5316-5324) [hereinafter BSA].
The congressional intent behind this legislation was to "require certain reports or
records where they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory
investigations or proceedings." 31 U.S.C. §5311. The vital component of the Bank Se-
crecy Act is a requirement that financial institutions file an IRS Form 4789, Currency
Transaction Report ("CTR"), whenever a person participates in one or more cash trans-
actions in a single day, that exceed, in total, US$10,000. See Sultzer, supra note 25, at
152-67 (discussing provisions of BSA). In enacting this legislation, Congress had hoped
to create a paper trail that would lead law enforcement authorities to potential money
laundering operations. Id. at 153. Congress also hoped that the BSA would serve as an
effective instrument in prosecuting money launderers, by imposing civil as well as crimi-
nal sanctions for non-compliance. Id.
209. See id. at 151-52 (citing growing drug trade in United States as major reason
for enacting BSA).
210. BSA, supra note 208.
211. See Barbot, supra note 161, at 184 (stating that Congress had found that laun-
dering of proceeds from narcotics trafficking, especially when it involves U.S. currency,
threatens national security of U.S.).
212. See BSA, supra note 208 (requiring domestic financial institutions to report
cash transactions in excess of US$10,000 to Secretary of Treasury).
213. See Barbot, supra note 161, at 185-86 (discussing various provisions of BSA).
214. See Sultzer, supra note 25, at 158-59 (discussing weaknesses of BSA which led
Congress to enact further legislation). Prosecutors were finding it difficult to prosecute
2044 FORDHAMINTERATATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:2014
with the BSA, due to the obvious gaps in the legislation, Con-
gress responded by enacting the Money Laundering Control Act
("MILCA") .215
The centerpiece of the MLCA was the criminalization of the
act of money laundering itself.216 This enabled authorities to
prosecute individuals for the actual act of money laundering
rather than for violations of the reporting requirement of the
BSA.2 17 It further prohibited the structuring of transactions in
order to circumvent reporting requirements, and provided for
civil and criminal forfeiture of property or proceeds involved in
the alleged laundering. 218
i. 18 U.S.C. Section 1956
18 U.S.C. Section 1956219 ("Section 1956"), prohibits indi-
viduals from concealing the nature of illicit funds or from using
such funds to further criminal activity. 22° Section 1956 divides
the crime of money laundering into three general categories.221
Where money is laundered through one or a series of financial
transactions, Section 1956 imposes a fine of up to the greater of
US$500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the
transaction. 222 Section 1956 (a) (2) imposes identical penalties
where monetary instruments are used to launder money across
money launderers based upon the failure to file a CTR. Id. at 158. Furthermore, there
were methods of circumventing the reporting requirement. Id. For example, a finan-
cial institution could satisfy the reporting requirement of the BSA by filing a CTR on
laundered money. Id. Such conduct would seldom lead to detection and subsequent
investigation by law enforcement authorities. Id. Other methods of circumvention in-
cluded structuring the transactions so that they did not trigger the reporting require-
ment, by depositing smaller sums. Id. at 159. Furthermore, financial institutions were
not obligated to inquire into the source of funds deposited. Id.
215. Money Laundering Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§1956-1957, 31 U.S.C. 5324-26) [hereinafter MLCA]; see
also Alford, supra note 16, at 456 (characterizing Money Laundering Control
Act("MLCA") as one of two most important statutes in U.S. anti-money laundering leg-
islation).
216. Id. at 457.
217. See id. at 457-58 (stating that in passing MLCA, Congress intended to make
proceeds of drug crimes worthless by imposing criminal liability on anyone dealing with
drug proceeds).
218. MLCA, supra note 215.
219. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1994).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).
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U.S. borders.223 Section 1956 (a)(3) pertains to law enforce-
ment sting operations.224
a. Section 1956 (a)(1)
Section 1956(a)(1) penalizes the conduct of anyone who
partakes in a financial transaction,225 knowing that the property
involved represented the proceeds from a specified unlawful ac-
tivity.2 2 6 The term specified unlawful activity, as defined in the
statute, covers a broad range of illicit activity including drug traf-
ficking, food stamp fraud, and various environmental crimes.22 7
In order to prove a violation of Section 1956, the govern-
ment must go beyond proving that a defendant has no legiti-
mate source of income. 22 8 It is important to note, however, that
in order to violate Section 1956, the alleged offender must know
that the property involved in the transaction represents the pro-
223. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(2).
224. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(3).
225. For the purposes of 18 U.S.C. §1956, a "transaction" includes:
a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition, and
with respect to a financial institution includes a deposit, withdrawal, transfer
between accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase
or sale of any stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instru-
ment, use of a safe deposit box, or any other payment, transfer, or delivery by,
through, or to a financial institution, by whatever means effected.
18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(3)
The term "financial transaction" is defined as:
A) a transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign com-
merce (i) involving the movement of funds by wire or other means or (ii)
involving one or more monetary instruments, or (iii) involving the transfer or
title to any real property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, or (B) a transaction involv-
ing the use of a financial institution which is engaged in, or the other activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) (4)
226. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1).
227. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c) (7) (listing various crimes which constitute specified
unlawful activity for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 ("Section 1956").
228. See United States v. Blackman, 897 F.2d 309, 317 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that
burden of proof is not so stringent that it requires the government to trace funds back
to a specific crime). For instance, "evidence of a defendant's use of wire service to
transfer cash to Haiti rather that a bank, combined with evidence of a defendant's drug
trafficking is sufficient to establish a conviction of money laundering under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956 (a) (1) (B) (i)." See Blackman, 897 F.2d at 317. If the government can show that
the defendant is making use of property bought with the proceeds of a "specified un-
lawful activity," or that the defendant's bank account contains commingled funds, only
part of which can be traced to unlawful activity, then the government has established a
§ 1956 (a) (1) violation. See Sultzer, supra note 25, at 160-61 (discussing government's
burden of proof in proving § 1956 (a)(1) violation).
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ceeds of some form of specified unlawful activity.229 In order to
prove this knowledge component, the government may use cir-
cumstantial evidence to infer the offender's knowledge or willful
blindness 230  to the fact that he engaged in a transaction
designed to launder the proceeds of some form of illicit activ-
ity.2
31
In order to violate Section 1956 (a) (1), a potential offender
must engage in or attempt to engage in a financial transaction
with funds that which he knew originated from some unlawful
activity and in fact stemmed from one of the specified unlawful
activities.232 Because the statute is relatively broad in its con-
struction, courts have loosely interpreted the term financial
transaction to include virtually any use of illicit funds which can
be remotely connected to interstate commerce.233 Where the ac-
tual transaction was attempted but not actually conducted, the
government must show that the defendant engaged in more
than mere preparation. 34  In order to violate Section
1956(a) (1), the defendant must take affirmative steps towards
229. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1). In order to prove this knowledge component of the
statute, the government does not need to prove that the offender actually knew of the
specific crime from which the proceeds arose. Id. Rather it means that "the person
knew the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form,
though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under State,
Federal, or foreign law." 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (c)(1).
230. See, e.g., United States v. Cambell, 977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that
under doctrine of willful blindness, government must prove more than simply that de-
fendant was negligent or even reckless and "should have known"; rather it requires
government to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant purposely and deliber-
ately contrived to avoid learning facts about what would have otherwise been obvious to
her).
231. See Sultzer, supra note 25, at 161-62 (discussing government's burden in prov-
ing that defendant had knowledge that property involved in alleged financial transac-
tion arose from proceeds of some form of "specified unlawful activity").
232. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).
233. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4) (defining term financial transaction for purposes
of statute). Thus a broad range of acts can be considered a "financial transaction"
under § 1956. Id. For example, the mailing of proceeds from illicit activity from one
state to another is deemed a "financial transaction." See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton,
931 F.2d 1046, 1051-52 (5th cir. 1991) (concluding that defendant's effort to mail pro-
ceeds of narcotics transaction from Mississippi to California amounted to money laun-
dering under 18 U.S.C. 1956).
234. See Sultzer, supra note 25, at 163 (noting that there must be substantial step
taken towards commission of crime, such as where defendant creates elaborate plan to
launder money through use of complicated financial transactions, and is subsequently
apprehended with money he intends to launder).
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committing the crime.2 5
b. Section 1956(a) (2): Money Laundering Involving the
Transportation of Monetary Instruments Across
U.S. Borders
Section 1956(a) (2) criminalizes the acts of anyone who
transports, transmits, or transfers a monetary instrument to or
from the United States, or attempts to do so, where the instru-
ment represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,
or where such act is intended to conceal the nature of the funds
or to avoid a transaction reporting requirement.236 The statute
defines the term monetary instrument quite broadly to include a
range of financial products.237  Courts have interpreted the
words transport, transmit, or transfer liberally enough to include
virtually any cross-border movement of funds into or out of the
United States.238
Where the U.S. government charges an individual with
transporting funds across U.S. borders with the intent of con-
cealing the nature of the funds or evading reporting require-
ments, it must prove the same components as those that are re-
quired by Section 1956(a) (1).239 The government must show
235. Compare United States v. Fuller, 974 F.2d 1474, 1477-78 (5th cir. 1992) (stating
that defendant who structured plan to launder illicit proceeds had attempted to con-
duct financial transaction within meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) when he was arrested
while leaving hotel just after receiving money which he intended to launder) with United
States v. Ramirez, 954 F.2d 1035, 1039-40(5th cir. 1992) (holding that mere possession of
illicit funds does not create inference of intent to engage in financial transaction).
236. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2).
237. 18 U.S.C. §1956(c)(5). The term monetary instruments means (i) coin or
currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers' checks, personal
checks, bank checks and money orders, or (ii) investment securities or negotiable in-
struments, in bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon deliv-
ery. Id.
238. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) (5). As a result of this broad interpretation, this statute
proscribes a range of activities, from smuggling to wire transfers. See, e.g., United States v.
Ortiz, 738 F. Supp. 1394 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that defendant who attempted to
smuggle illicit proceeds out of United States in water heater destined for air shipment
to Columbia was guilty of money laundering pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2) (B) (ii)
by attempting to transport funds across U.S. borders with intent to evade reporting
requirements). As cross border transfers of funds are generally unambiguous acts, it is
generally easy for the government to prove that the defendant engaged in or attempted
such proscribed conduct. See Sultzer, supra note 24, at 165 (discussing range of conduct
that constitutes money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2)).
239. See Sultzer, supra note 25, at 166 (noting that intent standard for violation of
Section 1956(a) (2) mirrors that or Section 1956(a) (1)).
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that the sum involved can be traced back to a specified unlawful
activity, and that the offender knew that the funds originated
from some form of illicit activity. 2 40 The proof requirement is
relaxed, however, where the government charges that such activ-
ity was conducted with the intent to promote the commission of
specified unlawful activity. 24 1 Under such a charge, mere intent
is sufficient to prove a violation.24 2 The offender need not know
that the funds originated from unlawful activity, nor does the
government need to prove that the funds were derived from a
specified unlawful activity.243
c. Section 1956(a) (3): Law Enforcement Operations Directed
at Money Laundering
The third category of money laundering offenses created
under Section 1956 deals with law enforcement operations
aimed at controlling money laundering.244 The components of
a money laundering offense under this category generally resem-
ble those of a violation under Section 1956(a) (1).2 45 The cate-
gories are different, however, in that the funds do not actually
have to stem from illicit activity. 246 All that is required is that a
law enforcement officer represents, and the offender believes,
that the funds originated from unlawful activity.2 47
ii. 18 U.S.C. Section 1957: Engaging in Monetary Transactions
in Property Derived From Specified Unlawful Activity
18 U.S.C. Section 1957248 ("Section 1957") exponentially ex-
pands the reach of Section 1956's prohibition on money laun-
240. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2) (B).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2) (A).
244. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (3).
245. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (prohibiting anyone from engaging in or at-
tempting to engage in financial transaction with funds which he knew originated from
specified unlawful activity) with 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (3) (prohibiting anyone from en-
gaging in or attempting to engage in financial transaction with funds represented to be
proceeds of specified unlawful activity).
246. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (3).
247. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(C). The statute defines the term represented as any
representation made by a law enforcement officer or by any other person at the direc-
tion of, or with the approval of, a Federal official authorized to investigate or prosecute
violations of Section 1956. Id.
248. 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (1994) ("Section 1957").
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dering.249  This section criminalizes the mere acceptance of
funds, in excess of US$10,000, that a defendant knows are de-
rived from unlawful activity.25 ° To prosecute under this statute,
the government need not meet the sometimes stringent stan-
dards of proof required by Section 1956.2 '1 There is no intent
component to this statute.2 5 2 The government need only prove
that an offender knowingly engaged or attempted to engage in a
monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of a
value exceeding US$10,000 and that traces back to a specified
unlawful activity. 25
3
In addition to establishing the crime of money laundering,
the MLCA also prohibited the structuring, attempted structur-
ing, and aiding and abetting in structuring transactions for the
purpose of avoiding reporting requirements. 25 4 The MLCA sub-
jects potential offenders to significant fines and possible impris-
onment for period not to exceed ten years. z55
The MLCA also contains major provisions designed to at-
tack criminal proceeds.2 56 Convinced that targeting the pro-
ceeds of drugs is the most effective method of controlling drug
trafficking,257 Congress enacted certain provisions which call for
249. See Sultzer, supra note 25, at 167 (noting that § 1957 greatly extends potential
scope of Section 1956's criminal prohibition against money laundering to cover situa-
tions in which defendants only bad act is having accepted funds in excess US$10,000,
which he knows are tainted).
250. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a).
251. Id.; see also Sultzer, supra note 25, at 167 (discussing how government is not
constrained by having to prove any of impermissible intentions found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956).
252. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a).
253. Id.
254. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1988).
255. Id. The Supreme Court recently interpreted this statute in Ratzlaf v. United
States, 114 S.Ct. 655 (1994). In Ratzlaf, the defendants intentionally structured a cash
transaction amounting to US$100,000, to pay off a gambling debt at a casino, to avoid
triggering the reporting requirement of the BSA. Id. at 657. The court concluded that
the willfulness component of the statute required that a defendant be aware of the
illegal nature of his actions. Id. at 663. In interpreting the statute, the Court observed
that Congress could have eliminated the references to willfulness, but neglected to do
so. Id. at 662. In response to the Ratzlaf decision, Congress amended the statute and
eliminated the willfulness component. Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-325 §411, 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (1994).
256. 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 982 (1988).
257. See Federal Government's Response to Money Laundering: Hearings Before
Committee on Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 200-01 (1993)
(testimony of Frederick B. Verinder, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative
Division, FBI) (opining that use of money laundering statutes reduces profitability of
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the civil and criminal forfeiture of property, real or personal,
involved in a transaction in violation of the money laundering
statutes,258 the structuring statute,259 or the currency transaction
reporting statute.26 °
5. The Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992
The Annunzio-Wylie Anti Money Laundering Act of
1992261 ("The Annunzio-Wylie Act"), serves as a supplement to
prior anti-money laundering legislation.262 Enacted largely as a
response to the BCCI Scandal, 263 these statutes call for the termi-
nation of a bank's charter, its insurance, or its license to do busi-
ness in the United States if it is charged with and subsequently
convicted of money laundering violations.264
Under the Annunzio-Wylie Act, the sanctions for banks con-
victed of money laundering differ depending on whether the
bank in question is domestic or a U.S.-based branch of a non-
criminal organizations through seizure and attacks underpinnings of enterprise by at-
tacking organizational infrastructure which facilitates money laundering function).
258. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and § 1957.
259. 31 U.S.C. §5324 .
260. 31 U.S.C. §5313
261. Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.) ("Annunzio-Wylie Act").
262. See Alford, supra note 16, at 460 (stating that Annunzio-Wylie Act implements
many of recommendations made by FATF).
263. See id. (citing BCCI failure as principal motivation behind enactment of An-
nunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act). In addition to the BCCI failure, the imple-
mentation of the Annunzio-Wylie Act may also be attributed to the discovery that the
United States Federal government lacked the authority to close BCCI's branch offices
within the United States, despite BCCI's convictions for money laundering violations.
Id.
264. 12 U.S.C. §§ 93, 1818, 3105 (1994). Under 12 U.S.C. § 1818, where a domes-
tic bank is convicted of money laundering a bank regulator must conduct hearings to
decide whether to revoke the bank's deposit insurance. 12 U.S.C. § 1818. This statute
further provides that bank officials convicted of money laundering violations, may be
banned entirely from the industry. Id. Under 12 U.S.C. § 93, the bank regulator may,
in the alternative, consider revoking the bank's charter or appointing a conservator to
take over and operate the bank. 12 U.S.C. § 93. With respect to branch offices of for-
eign banks located in the United States, the Federal Reserve Board must begin termina-
tion proceedings at once under 12 U.S.C. § 3105. 12 U.S.C. § 3105. When the banks in
question is a domestic institution, the proposed sanctions in these statutes are not
mandatory. See Alford, supra note 16, at 460 (noting that where domestic bank is con-
victed of money laundering, appropriate bank regulator must hold hearing to deter-
mine if bank should lose its charter or deposit insurance).
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U.S. bank.265 A branch office of a non-U.S. bank convicted of
money laundering may be shut down,2 6 6 while a domestic bank
may face termination, or revocation of its deposit insurance.267
The Annunzio-Wylie Act addressed the problem of money
laundering in non-bank financial institutions by extending the
statute's application to all financial institutions.268 It further
gave the U.S. Secretary of Treasury the authority to require all
financial institutions, as opposed to just depository institutions,
to report cash transactions in excess of US$10,000 to the Inter-
nal Revenue Service.26 9 In addition, Congress gave the Depart-
ment of Treasury the ability to promulgate know-your-customer
rules, to be used by all financial institutions.27" These rules re-
quired financial institutions to inquire about the identity of all
individuals and financial institutions it does business with.2 7 1
The Annunzio-Wylie Act also called for financial institutions to
report suspicious transactions to the Department of Treasury.272
265. See Alford, supra note 16, at 460-61 (discussing possible penalties for domestic
banks found guilty of money laundering).
266. Annunzio-Wylie Act §1507, 12 U.S.C. § 3105 (Supp. IV 1992).
267. Id. §§ 1502,1503, 12 U.S.C. §§ 93(c), 1818 (Supp. IV 1992); see also 138 Cong.
Rec. §17, 912 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992). In order to avoid losing its charter or deposit
insurance, a bank must show that it tried to the best of its ability to prevent money
laundering from occurring. See Alford, supra note 15, at 461 (discussing alternatives
available to domestic bank convicted of money laundering violations). The bank bears
the burden of proving the degree of involvement of the bank's senior management in
the money laundering activity; the bank's preventive measures against money launder-
ing; the bank's level of cooperation with law enforcement authorities; the bank's new
internal controls to prevent money laundering from occurring, which have been insti-
tuted since the offense; and the impact on the community if the bank is shut down.
Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1501, 12 U.S.C. §1956 (Supp. IV 1992).
268. See Afford, supra note 16, at 463 (discussing impact of enactment of Annun-
zio-Wylie Act upon financial institutions).
269. 26 U.S.C. § 6501 (1988).
270. 12 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1992).
271. 31 U.S.C. § 5327 (Supp. IV 1992). These identification requirements apply to
all parties doing business with a financial institution regardless of whether or not they
hold an account. See Alford, supra note 16, at 461-64 (discussing provisions of Annun-
zio-Wylie Act).
272. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1992). With the enactment of the Annunzio-Wylie
Act, banks were posed with a dilemma when reporting suspicious transactions. See Al-
ford, supra note 16, at 463-64 (discussing how Annunzio-Wylie Act has accentuated di-
lemma that banks face with respect to reporting suspicious transactions to law enforce-
ment authorities). On the one hand, a failure to report enough information about a
party they are doing business with, could result in a conviction for money laundering
violations. Id. On the other hand, the disclosure of too much information could to
civil liability, as customers may file suit against them for breach of confidentiality. Id.
While this dilemma may have existed to some degree since the enactment of the Money
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6. The Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994
The U.S. anti-money laundering regime was further bol-
stered with the enactment of the Money Laundering Suppres-
sion Act of 1994 ("MLSA") .273 Provisions of the MLSA call upon
states to develop and implement laws in order to license and
regulate businesses that provide check cashing, currency ex-
change, or money transmitting or remittance services, or issue or
redeem money orders, travelers' checks, or other similar instru-
ments. 274  Under the MLSA, the states must proscribe criminal
or civil penalties for variance from state licensing and federal
BSA reporting requirements.
The MLSA also requires that all money transmitting busi-
nesses in the United States register with the Secretary of Treas-
ury.275 Beyond the requirements posed by the BSA and the In-
ternal Revenue Service code, the statute does not impose any
new from of regulation on businesses. 276 The MLSA does, how-
Laundering Control Act, it was exacerbated by the Annunzio-Wylie Act and the strin-
gent sanctions it imposed for banks involved in money laundering operations. Id.
The precarious position of banks was further complicated by the fact that several
states have recognized that banks have a duty to maintain customer confidentiality, and
cause of action for the breach of this duty. See, e.g., Young v. Chemical Bank, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 7, 1992, at 23 (Supreme Court, New York County) (holding that banks have duty of
confidentiality to their customers).
The Annunzio-Wylie Act alleviates some of the concerns that banks hold with re-
spect to liability for disclosure of customer information. See Alford, supra note 16, at 463
(discussing effects of Annunzio-Wylie Act upon bank disclosure of customer informa-
tion). The statute provides that banks shall not be liable under federal or state laws for
any customer information given to law enforcement authorities. 31 U.S.C.
§ 5318(g) (3). While this safe harbor provision shields banks from civil liability, it does
not immunize them against criminal liability. See Mark Arend, Money Laundering Law is
(so far) Mostly a Blessing, Am. BANKERS' Ass'N BANKING J., Feb. 1993, at 69. This protec-
tion against civil liability, however, is not a comprehensive one. See Alford, supra note
16, at 463-64 (discussing how Annunzio-Wylie Act offers limited protection against civil
liability). As such, banks should carefully consider the degree of potential tort liability
before disclosing customer information. Id. Nevertheless, while the Annunzio-Wylie
Act increases the penalties for involvement in money laundering operations, it does
offer banks some degree of protection for compliance. Id.
273. Public L. No. 103-325 §401-13, 108 Stat. 2160, 2243-55 (codified in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.); see also Sultzer, supra note 25, at 216 (noting that
Congress focused on controlling money laundering committed through non-bank fi-
nancial institutions when creating the MLSA).
274. 31 U.S.C. § 5311.
275. 31 U.S.C. § 5330.
276. See Sultzer, supra note 25, at 217 (stating that MLSA does not impose any new
regulations on businesses beyond those already established through BSA and IRS
codes).
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ever, explicitly provide that no businesses shall be exempted
from existing or future state licensing or regulation require-
ments.
2 7 7
b. United Kingdom Anti-Money Laundering Legislation
The United Kingdom has demonstrated a firm commitment
to controlling global money laundering.27 8 As the largest finan-
cial center in Europe, the United Kingdom is highly susceptible
to money laundering.279 It may be because of this vulnerability
that the United Kingdom has served as the leader in Europe in
enacting anti-money laundering legislation. 280 The Drug Traf-
ficking Offenses Act of 1986281 marked the first major piece of
anti-money laundering legislation in the United Kingdom. 82
The Drug Trafficking Act 1994283 consolidates the Drug Traffick-
ing Offenses Act of 1986.284 The Proceeds of Crime Act 199585
allows the U.K. to further combat money laundering by enabling
courts to confiscate the proceeds of crime.286 Finally, the Money
Laundering Regulations 1993287 provide guidelines for financial
institutions to follow on order to prevent their use as a vehicle
for money laundering activity.288
277. 31 U.S.C. § 5330. In addition the statute provides for civil penalties of up to
US$5,000 per day, for each day that a business operates without a license or with a
license that contains fraudulent information. Id. In addition, the statute calls for crimi-
nal penalties of up to five years imprisonment and the possible application of criminal
forfeiture provisions. Id.
278. See Zagaris & Castilla, supra note 68, at 934 (stating that United Kingdom's
commitment to fighting money laundering is evidenced by its ratification of Vienna
Convention, its drafting and signing of Council of Europe Convention, and its member-
ship in organizations like FATF and Basle Committee).
279. Id. at 933-34.
280. See id. at 934 (stating that as of 1993, United Kingdom had most comprehen-
sive and extensive anti-money laundering legislation).
281. Drug Trafficking Offenses Act of 1986, ch. 32 (Eng.).
282. See Rider, supra note 30, at 406-07 (discussing significance of Drug Trafficking
Offenses Act of 1986).
283. Drug Trafficking Act 1994, ch. 37 (Eng.).
284. See Rider, supra note 30, at 407-08 (discussing significance of Drug Trafficking
Act 1994 to United Kingdom anti-money laundering regime).
285. Proceeds of Crime (Scotland) Act, ch. 43 (Eng.).
286. See Clark, supra note 16, at 474 (stating that Proceeds of Crime Act broadens
power of court to make confiscation orders).
287. Money Laundering Regulations 1993, SI 1993/1993 (Eng.).
288. See Lee, supra note 7, at 233 (discussing impetus for establishing Money
Laundering Regulations 1993).
2054 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 21:2014
i. Drug Trafficking Offenses Act of 1986
U.K. legislation imposing criminal liability upon those in-
volved in money laundering activity developed in the mid-
1980s. 28 9 Traditionally, the United Kingdom's method of ap-
proaching money laundering has focused on the three catego-
ries of drugs, terrorism, and other crimes.2 °0 The crucial piece
of legislation in U.K. anti-money laundering regime is the Drug
Trafficking Offences Act of 1986291 ("DTOA"), which made
money laundering a crime.292 The DTOA provides for the pre-
arrest investigation of assets which are suspected to be derived
from the proceeds of drug trafficking, the freezing of assets
upon arrest or issuance of a summons, and the issuance of con-
fiscation order after a conviction.2 93
Section 24 of the DTOA creates a criminal offense out of
assisting a drug trafficker in retaining the proceeds of his
crimes.294 The provision focuses upon those individuals who ac-
tually launder drug money and imposes stringent sanctions for
289. See Clark, supra note 16, at 473 (discussing impetus for developing anti-money
laundering legislation in England). While legislation criminalizing money laundering
was not developed in England until the 1980s, individuals involved in laundering the
proceeds of crime, prior to this, were often prosecuted for violating Section 22(1) of
the Theft Act 1968. Id. Theft Act 1968, §22(1) (Eng.). The Theft Act 1968 reflects the
fact that Parliament realized the importance of imposing criminal penalties for those
who facilitate the realization of stolen property. Id. Section 22(1) of the Theft Act
1968 provides that an individual is culpable of handling stolen goods if he "dishonestly
undertakes or assists in their retention, removal, disposal or realization, by or for the
benefit of any other person." Theft Act 1968, ch. 60, § 22(1) (Eng.). As this legislation
was limited in scope to the handling of goods which are or represent stolen property, it
prompted Parliament to enact further legislation. See Clark, supra note 16, at 470-71
(discussing reasons for enacting U.K. anti-money laundering legislation).
290. See Rider, supra note 30, at 407 (noting that Drug Trafficking Offenses Act
1986 and Drug Trafficking Act 1994 relate to money laundering in connection with
drug trafficking). The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1989 and the Northern Ireland
Act 1991, pertain to money laundering offenses as they relate to terrorist activity. Id. at
410-11. The Criminal Justice Act of 1993 provides for money laundering offenses as
they pertain to other crimes. Id. at 414.
291. Drug Trafficking Offenses Act 1986, ch. 32 (Eng.).
292. See Rider, supra note 30, at 406 (stating that prior to enactment of Drug Traf-
ficking Offenses Act ("DTOA"), there was little discussion in Britain concerning money
laundering). Prior to the enactment of the DTOA, discussion on money laundering
centered on the need to reinforce provisions for confiscature and forfeiture of the pro-
ceeds of crime. Id. Similar legislation exists in Scotland, known as the Criminal Justice
Act, 1987, ch. 41. Criminal Justice Act (Scot.)
293. See Lee, supra note 7, at 232 (discussing provisions of DTOA).
294. Drug Trafficking Offenses Act 1986, ch. 32, § 24 (a) (Eng.).
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those who violate the law.295 A violation of the DTOA is punish-
able by fines, imprisonment of up to fourteen years, or both.
29 6
A violation of the DTOA is committed when anyone who know-
ing, or suspecting that someone is a drug trafficker, either holds
or controls the illicit proceeds, or places funds at the drug traf-
ficker's disposal, or provides the individual with any assistance in
investing those funds.2 97
The U.K. anti-money laundering regime underwent a major
overhaul over the past eight years.298 A significant portion of the
new legislation was devoted towards criminalizing the activities
of those who assist in money laundering.2 99
ii. Drug Trafficking Act 1994
The Drug Trafficking Act 199400 ("DTA") essentially con-
solidated the laws established under the Drug Trafficking Of-
fenses Act 1986.01 Similar to Section 24 of the DTOA, Section
50 of the DTA 0 2 established the crime of assisting another in
retaining the benefits of drug trafficking.30 3 Under Section 50,
anyone who enters into an arrangement to facilitate another's
retention of drug money, and who knows or suspects that the
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See Clark, supra note 16, at 476-77 (discussing Parliament's motives in enact-
ing further anti-money laundering legislation). This increase in anti-money laundering
legislation may be largely attributed to the realization in England that the narcotics
trade within the nation was growing at exponential rates. Id. In 1989, the Home Affairs
Committee of the House of Commons conducted a review of the effectiveness of the
DTOA. Id. The Committee was distressed over estimates of at least £1.8 billion in drug
proceeds being injected into the English financial system, as well as the growing con-
cern among other countries that Britain was rapidly becoming an offshore banking
system for drug money laundering. Id. After conducting the review, the Home Affairs
Committee recommended that the government swiftly respond to the growing levels of
money laundering through further legislation. See U.S. Senate Committee on Govern-
ment Affairs, 1985, reprinted in RowAN BOSWORTH-DAvIES & GRATHAM SALTMARSH,
MONEY LAUNDERING: A PRACrICAL GUIDE TO THE NEW LEGISLATION 116 (describing Par-
liament's concerns which led to development of anti-money laundering legislation in
1990s).
299. See Clark, supra note 16, at 473-74 (stating that new legislation targeted those
who benefit from money laundering rather than launderers themselves).
300. Drug Trafficking Act 1994, ch. 37 (Eng.).
301. See Clark, supra note 16, at 475 (stating that DTA essentially consolidates
DTOA).
302. Drug Trafficking Act 1994, ch. 37, § 50 (Eng.).
303. Id.
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individual is someone benefiting from drug trafficking is guilty
of an offense.3 °4
Section 51 of the DTA3 °Sestablishes the offense of know-
ingly acquiring or possessing property derived from drug traf-
ficking. °6 Expansive in its scope, the statute defines possession
of property as committing any act in relation to it.3 0 7 As a result,
criminally liability is extended to those who know that a particu-
lar person is involved in drug trafficking and acquires or uses
property which represents the proceeds of the drug traffick-
ing.' ° s It is important to note, however, that in order to commit
an offense under this provision, the person involved must actu-
ally know that the property involved is derived from drug traf-
ficking.3
0 9
Under the United Kingdom laws, the mere knowledge that
an individual is or may be involved in laundering the proceeds
of drug trafficking, in certain cases, is a criminal offense. 3 10
Under Section 52 of the DTA, a person is guilty of violating the
304. Id. This provision has a significant impact on financial intermediaries. See
Clark, supra note 16, at 475 (discussing ramifications of this legislation for financial
intermediaries). An intermediary who, acting on behalf of a client, enters into a trans-
action suspecting that the relevant funds are tainted faces criminal liability. Id. Penal-
ties for a violation of the DTA include an unlimited fine, and fourteen years in prison.
Id. In order to violate the DTA, it is enough that the person assisted received payment
with respect to a third party's trafficking. Id. An offender need not have been directly
involved himself. See Drug Trafficking Act 1994, ch. 37, §51 (Eng.) (stating that individ-
ual is guilty of offense if "knowing that any property is, or in whole or in part directly or
indirectly represents, another person's proceeds of drug trafficking, he acquires or uses
that property or has possession of it."). It is a defense that the alleged assistor "ac-
quired or used the property or had possession of it for adequate consideration." Id. at
§ 51 (1) (c).
305. Drug Trafficking Act 1994, ch. 37, § 51 (Eng.).
306. Id.
307. See Drug Trafficking Act 1994, ch. 37, § 51(7) (Eng.) (defining term posses-
sion of property as doing anything in relation to it).
308. Drug Trafficking Act 1994, ch. 37, § 51(2) (Eng.). While it may be a defense
to a violation of this provision to prove that the alleged offender has given adequate
consideration for the property, Section 51(4) explicitly states that the provision of serv-
ices which assist drug traffickers in their illegal operations do not constitute adequate
consideration for the purposes of the statute. Id.
309. See Rider, supra note 30, at 409-10 (noting that mere suspicion that property
in question is derived from drug trafficking is not enough to constitute violation of
Section 51(1) of DTA).
310. See Drug Trafficking Act 1994, ch. 37, § 52(1) (stating that person is guilty of
offense if he knows or suspects that another person is engaged in drug money launder-
ing and fails to report information to law enforcement authorities, provided that infor-
mation was obtained through course of his trade, business, or profession).
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law if, in the course of business, trade, profession, or employ-
ment, he comes to know or suspect that someone is involved in
money laundering, and fails to disclose the information to law
enforcement authorities as soon as reasonably practicable.311
Under this law, to suspect that an individual is engaged in
money laundering operations and fail to report those suspicions
is a crime punishable with incarceration.3 12
iii. Proceeds of Crime Act 1995
The Proceeds of Crime (Scotland) Act 1995,13 ("PCA") a
recent addition to Britain's anti-money laundering regime, re-
flects the widely held belief among law enforcement officials that
the most effective method of fighting money laundering is
through the confiscation of assets.3 14 English courts have held
the power to confiscate the proceeds of crime, following a con-
viction, for many years.315 Until the enactment of the PCA, how-
ever, the courts rarely exercised this power. 6 In addition to
broadening the court's power to make confiscation orders, the
PCA imposes a duty upon courts to confiscate the proceeds of
crime in certain cases.3 17 Section 1 of the PCA s requires a
court to confiscate the proceeds of a crime whenever a prosecu-
tor makes a written request.3 19 This requirement applies to all
indictable offenses. 2 °
Section 2 of the PCA321 further empowers courts.322 This
311. Id.
312. See Clark, supra note 16, at 477-78 (stating that Section 52 of Drug Trafficking
Act 1994 may be most draconian of new anti-money laundering laws). The offense is
punishable with a maximum of five years imprisonment. Id. Section 52 of the DTA
places a substantial burden upon financial institutions to report any suspicions that they
may have. Id.
313. Proceeds of Crime Act 1995 (Scotland), ch. 43 (Eng.) [hereinafter PCA]
314. See Clark, supra note 16, at 473-74 (discussing determination of British gov-
ernment to combat money laundering by confiscating end product).
315. See, e.g., Drug Trafficking Act 1994, ch. 37, § 19 (Eng.) (providing for issu-
ance of confiscation orders where defended had absconded or died).
316. See Clark, supra note 16, at 474 (noting that English courts had, in past, rarely
used their power to confiscate proceeds of crime).
317. Proceeds of Crime Act 1995 (Scotland), ch. 43, § I (Eng.).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at § 1 (2) (a) (stating that the provision applies to any offense which has
been prosecuted on indictment).
321. Proceeds of Crime (Scotland) Act 1995, ch. 43, § 2.
322. Id.
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section allows courts to assume that all assets held by an offender
upon conviction represent the proceeds of crime.323 Further-
more, it enables courts to also assume that any property acquired
by the offender in the six years prior to the conviction also repre-
sents the proceeds of crime.324 These provisions are also
mandatory. 325
iv. Money Laundering Regulations 1993
The Money Laundering Regulations 1993326 ("1993 Regula-
tions") were enacted in order to implement U.K. obligations
with respect to the European Council's Directive on the Preven-
tion of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money
Laundering.32 7 The U.K. designed the 1993 Regulations with
the objective of ensuring that financial institutions maintain in-
ternal systems to combat money laundering.3 28 The 1993 Regu-
lations require that anyone involved in a financial business look
into the identity of those they form a business relationship
with.329 The 1993 Regulations further require that businesses
keep records of all transactions for a period and five years. 330 In
addition, financial institutions must establish an internal system
through which anyone with a suspicion of laundering may report
their suspicion.331 Financial institutions must also train their
323. Id. § 2(2) (a) (enabling court to assume that any property or other economic
advantage which has been obtained by defendant since relevant date has been obtained
in connection with commission of offense).
324. Id. at § 2(6).
325. Id. at § 2(4). An individual convicted of violating this act is offered slight
degree of protection in that the statute only permits courts to make such an assumption
where a prosecutor has given it written notice that such an assumption is appropriate.
Id.
326. Money Laundering Regulations 1993, SI 1993/1993 (Eng.) [hereinafter the
1993 Regulations]. Promulgated on July 20, 1993, the 1993 Regulations became effec-
tive on April 1, 1994. See Lee, supra note 7, at 233 n.216 (noting that 1993 Regulations
adopted the Council Directive). The United Kingdom was the first European Union
Member to adopt the Council Directive. Id.
327. See Lee, supra note 7, at 233 (noting that United Kingdom was first European
Union Member to adopt Council Directive).
328. See Clark, supra note 16, at 481 (discussing purpose in enacting 1993 regula-
tions).
329. Id. at 481.
330. Id. Financial institutions must also hold on to the proof of identity offered by
the parties with whom they conduct business. Id.
331. Id. Once a report is made to the designated officer of a company, he must
have access to any records that may enable him to reach a decision as to whether to
report the suspicion to the National Criminal Intelligence Service. Id.
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staff to recognize money laundering techniques and teach them
of their duties under the law.332
B. India
India has enacted a variety of measures to counter narcotics
trafficking and money laundering.33 3 In recent years, India has
become a significant money laundering concern for law enforce-
ment officials.33 4 Scholars contend that India's efforts at com-
batting money laundering have, thus far, proved ineffective.
1. The Heroin Problem
Over the past two decades, India has become a major transit
point for narcotics trafficking, particularly for heroin.3 36 Situ-
ated between what are known as the Golden Crescent 33 7 to the
332. Id. The regulations place a heavy burden upon financial institutions. See id. at
482 (discussing onerous burden placed upon financial institutions as result of Money
Laundering Regulations). When introduced, the Regulations met a tremendous
amount of disapproval from members of the financial industry. See Roger Fink, UK
Bankers Right to Worry about Directive, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1994 at 16. Failure to imple-
ment adequate staff training is now a criminal offense, punishable with two years impris-
onment. See 1993 Regulations § 5.
333. See FLETCHER N. BALDWIN. JR. & ROBERT J. MUNRO, Money Laundering, Asset
Forfeiture and International Financial Crimes, in India 3 (1996) (discussing Indian laws
aimed at money laundering and drug trafficking). Asset forfeiture legislation allows for
the freezing of assets in domestic crimes. Id. India also freezes deposits of individuals
convicted of narcotics trafficking in foreign countries. See Narcotics Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances Act (1985) (India). Under the provisions of the Narcotics Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, law enforcement officials may freeze the assets of an indi-
vidual convicted of narcotics trafficking. See BALDWIN AND MUNRO, at 3 (discussing pro-
visions of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances Act). Although India has an asset for-
feiture law in place, it contains several loopholes and requires several years to prosecute
as a criminal matter. Id. As a result, the law is virtually ineffective. Id.; see also, Zagaris,
supra note 65 at 911-12 (discussing importance of asset forfeiture laws in effective anti-
money laundering regime).
334. Id. at 6.
335. Id. at 4. For example, although drug-related money laundering is a crime,
drug traffickers continue to launder their proceeds through various methods, including
the purchase and sale of gold. Id. at 3. In order to circumvent the law, drug traffickers
use their proceeds to buy gold in foreign countries which they then smuggle into India
and sell at a higher price. Id.
336. See Letter From President to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the
House committee on Appropriations and International Relations and the Senate Com-
mittee on Appropriations and Foreign Relations, supra note 8, at *1 (naming India as
major drug transit country).
337. See Senthil Ratnasabapathy, Drugs-Afghanistan: Plant Something Else U.N. Tells
Growers, IrTER PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 18, 1996, available in Westlaw 1996 WL 13589229
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west, and the Golden Triangle338 to the east, the world's two
largest opium poppy producing areas, India has unwittingly be-
come a major transit point in the heroin trade." 9 Every day,
from points such as New Delhi and Bombay dozens of kilograms
of pure grade heroin are shipped out of India, bound for desti-
nations in Western Europe and the United States.3 4 °
India's involvement in the heroin trade with the Golden
Crescent, which is comprised of Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Af-
ghanistan, dates back to the late 1970s and early 1980s.41 The
preference for routing the heroin through India rather than by
land into Western Europe resulted from strict border patrol in
the area. 42 As a consequence of the wars under way in the re-
gion, borders activity in these countries was strictly monitored.343
The countries of the Golden Crescent have begun to estab-
lish other avenues for their heroin rather than routing it
through India. 44 In particular, with the emergence of the for-
mer Soviet Republics, and their growing drug mafias, the
druglords of the Indian subcontinent have turned to much safer
routes of transportation. 34 5
(identifying Golden Crescent as opium producing region of Southwest Asia, comprised
of Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan).
338. See Rone Tempest, India Emerging as a Major Hub of Heroin Trade, L.A. TIMES,
June 22, 1986, at 2 (identifying Golden Triangle as opium producing area situated to
Southeast of India, comprised of Myanmar (formerly known as Burma), Laos, and Thai-
land).
339. See Tim McGirk, et el., Heroin's Deadly Detour Smugglers are Now Sending the Drug
Through India to the West-With Help from Crooked Police, TIME INT'L, Dec. 20, 1996, at 30
[hereinafter Heroin's Deadly Detour].
340. Id.
341. See Ratnasabapathy, supra note 337. As this region of the world remained war
torn for years, several of its poor turned to poppy cultivation as a means of sustenance
in an era of economic strife. Id. The wars had destroyed much of the other agricultural
products in the area, thereby making poppy cultivation one of the only ways for farmers
to generate enough income. Id. As the violence and turbulence continued to plague
the area, an increasing number of people turned to poppy cultivation. For example, in
1978 opium production in Afghanistan was at 200 metric tons per year. Id. By 1994,
opium production had reached a staggering level of 3500 metric tons. Id. According to
the United Nations Drug Control Program, there are in excess of 200,000 families in
Afghanistan involved with opium production. Id.
342. See Sujay Mehdudia, India: Drug Mafias Multiply, Change Tactics, THE HINDU,
May 7, 1997, at 16.
343. Id. The possibility of sending the heroin by land into Europe was further
limited by the stricter narcotics policies and border control of the Communist regimes
situated along the route to western Europe. Id.
344. Id.
345. See Assessing the Current Trends in Opium Production and Heroin Trafficking: Ad-
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The decline in heroin entering India from the southwest,
however, has not led to a decline in narcotics trafficking in In-
dia.146 As the heroin traffic from the Golden Crescent countries
decreased, the amount of heroin entering India from its eastern
neighbors increased exponentially. 347 To the east of India lies
the Golden Triangle. The countries of the Golden Triangle
form the largest opium producing region in the world. 48
In the past, the heroin produced in this Southeast Asian re-
gion was sent to the west from Thailand.349 Until recently, her-
oin flowed freely through the Thai borders, especially from My-
anmar.350 Stricter patrol of the Thai borders, however, has re-
sulted in a decline in the amount of heroin entering the
country.35' As an alternative to Thailand, the druglords of
Southeast Asia have chosen India as the transit point for their
large scale narcotics operations. 52
Aided by Rangoon's military regime, the State Law and Or-
dress by Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters Melvin Levitsky, June 15, 1992,
U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch 468, available in Westlaw, 1992 WL 3118605 [hereinafter the
Levitsky Address] (stating that breakup of Soviet Union has opened up number of safer
land routes, through the countries, into Western Europe). International law enforce-
ment officials fear that the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union could give rise to
a new Baltic Route for smuggling heroin through northern Europe. Id.
346. See Heroin's Deadly Detour, supra note 339 (discussing increase in heroin com-
ing into India from countries of Southeast Asia).
347. Id.
348. See id. (noting that Golden Triangle is comprised of 38 million hectares of
poppy cultivated land, constituting -over 60% of global opium supply).
349. See id. (discussing Thailand's role in global heroin trade).
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. The choice to use India as a conduit for smuggling heroin is an obvious
one. Id. The bulk of the world's illicit opium is grown in Myanmar (formerly known as
Burma), India's northeastern neighbor. Id. With the possibility of sending its heroin to
the east into Thailand thwarted, the Burmese turned to the west. Id. Myanmar's border
with India, which spans 1,643 km through the dense jungles of the Himalayan foothills,
is virtually impossible to patrol. Id. The border is simply too long and the terrain too
rugged. Id. Moreover, relative to other countries in the region, India has a developed
infrastructure and is well connected to major international destinations by way of roads,
rail, sea and air. See Mehdudia, supra note 342. The ports and airports of India serve as
a gateway to the west for these lesser developed, more isolated countries. Id.
The Burmese looked to history to establish their original-heroin smuggling route.
See Rupa Chinai & Rahul Goswami, Health-Asia: Golden Triangle Heroin Trade Fuels HIVI
AIDS, INrER PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 28, 1997, available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 7075091 (not-
ing that early Indo-Burmese heroin trade followed the old opium routes of British em-
pire, which connected India and Burma through a series of roadways). Heroin was
smuggled into India via "Highway 39," the roadway established by the British which
runs along the Indo-Burmese border. See Heroin's Deadly Detour, supra note 339 (observ-
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der Restoration Council 5 ' ("SLORC"), opium travels freely in
Myanmar towards the Indian border. 54 Once in India, the her-
oin is shipped to destinations throughout the globe.355
A significant amount of the heroin remains within the coun-
try."' India's growing role in the global narco-trade has given
rise to a generation of people who have grown up with easy ac-
cess to heroin.357 In a country that has long suffered from severe
poverty, heroin is so cheap that it is accessible to even the
poorest income groups.3 58  Drug abuse now plagues the Indian
subcontinent.
3 59
ing that drug smugglers now avoid using Highway 39, as Indian narcotics enforcement
agents are now beginning to patrol area heavily).
353. See Levitsky Address, supra note 345 (stating that opium production in Burma
is largely off limits to central government and in control of insurgent armies, with which
Rangoon government has reached accommodations in order to finance its own activi-
ties).
354. See Heroin's Deadly Detour, supra note 339 (stating that opium is carried in
government vehicles sporting official stickers on their windshields, to central city of
Mandalay). It is suspected by most that the State Law and Order Restoration Council
("SLORC") uses the proceeds from the opium operation to buy illegal arms. Id. For the
opium that has already been processed and turned into heroin, the shipments go
straight across the border to the Indian state of Manipur. Id. The Heroin arrives in the
town of Moreh, Manipur's main gateway to the Golden Triangle. See R. Dev Raj, India-
Narcotics: Heroin Trade Breeds HIV Infection, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 1, 1997 available in
Westlaw, 1997 WL 13256889 (discussing impact of Indo-Burmese heroin trade on
northeastern India). Pure opium being smuggled from Mandalay is usually sent to the
border towns to be processed in the laboratories that have emerged in recent years. See
Heroin's Deadly Detour, supra note 339 (detailing process through which heroin is smug-
gled into India). Once converted into heroin, the drug is then hidden in everything
from mattresses to cans of tuna, and then smuggled over to India by small scale smug-
glers. Id.
There are allegations of government corruption on the other side of the border as
well. Id. While Indian Officials deny it, it is widely suspected that the Indian military is
deeply entrenched in the lucrative narcotics trade. Id. In 1988, an army major was
arrested for smuggling two kilograms of heroin across the Burmese border. Id. While
his charges were subsequently dropped, there have been at least ten other high ranking
military officials who have been arrested. Id. All of these individuals, however, have
managed to extricate themselves of the charges. Id.
355. Id.
356. See Levitsky Address, supra note 345 (noting that India is experiencing explo-
sive increase in heroin consumption).
357. See R. Dev Raj, supra note 354 (discussing local consumption of heroin in
India).
358. See India Emerging as a Major Hub of Heroin Trade, supra note 338, at 2 (stating
that Heroin sold for approximately US$3 a gram on streets of India in 1986). By com-
parison, in the United States, one gram of heroin sold for more than US$1200. Id.
359. See Chinai & Goswami, supra note 352 (discussing proliferation of HIV within
India). The numbers are staggering. Id. Within the border state of Manipur a state with
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2. Indian Initiatives to Combat Money Laundering
As the problems of narcotics trafficking and abuse within
India escalate, combatting these problems through legislation
and law enforcement have become an issue of paramount im-
portance. 6 ° Inadequate banking and monetary transaction leg-
islation facilitates money laundering in India.361 In addition, the
reluctance on the part of Indian bank's to depart from their
stringent bank secrecy policies, further enables individuals to
launder money in India.3 62 The money laundering problem in
India is even further complicated by the ancient underground
banking system of Hawala.363 Unless these financial crimes are
strictly penalized, the enforcement of any anti-money laundering
regime will prove extremely difficult. 364 In an effort to eliminate
money laundering, the Indian government drafted the Money
a population of less than two million, there are an estimated an estimated 40,000 intra-
venous heroin users. Id.
The proliferation of heroin abuse has had deadly consequences within India. Id.
The burgeoning generation of heroin addicts in India has given rise to an increasing
need for needles and syringes. Id. In an effort to control heroin abuse, the state of
Manipur exercised a ban on the sale of hypodermic needles in 1990. Id. As a result,
addicts began to share equipment. Id.
While the state has since repealed its ban on the sale of hypodermic needles, it has
not escaped the consequences. Id. A state which houses approximately .2% of the
country's population, Manipur is the home to 10% of the known HIV cases in India. Id.
Whereas in 1989 the HLV infection rate among intravenous drug users was zero in 1990,
it was estimated this year at 80.7%. Id.
360. See Record Number of Nations Battle Laundering, U.S. Says, 5/1/93 MONEY LAUN-
DERING ALERT, available in Westlaw 1993 WL 2782651 (discussing findings of Interna-
tional Narcotics Strategy Report stating that money laundering is growing concern in
India, whereas it was not a concern in 1990).
361. Id.
362. See Ashutosh Kumar Sinha, Banks Reluctant to Lift Veil of Secrecy on Errant Cli-
ents, Bus. STANDARD, Mar. 10, 1997, at 12 (discussing difficulties investigative agencies
are having in obtaining information about dubious transactions from public sector
banks). Law enforcement officials note that foreign banks located in India are more
forthcoming when similar information is sought from them. Id. India has a long tradi-
tion of customer confidentiality. Id. As such, banks are not subject to currency transac-
tion reporting requirements. See Sarbajeet K. Sen, India: RBI Against Compulsory Disclo-
sure by Banks, Bus. LINE (THE HINDU) Sept. 15, 1997, available in Westlaw, WL 13715822
(discussing RBI's Concerns about compulsory disclosure); see generally Zagaris & Cas-
tilla, supra note 68, at 909 (1993) (stating that principle of effective anti-money launder-
ing law is erosion of right to financial secrecy).
363. See Rider, supra note 30, at 403-04 (discussing development of underground
banking systems in certain societies).
364. See id. (discussing difficulties in combating underground banking systems).
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Laundering Prevention Bill ("MLPB").165 It has also entered
into agreements with certain countries to assist each other in
money laundering investigations. 66
a. The Money Laundering Prevention Bill
The Indian government recently drafted the MLPB1 6' Ex-
pansive in its scope, the MLPB prohibits the laundering of the
proceeds of a number of crimes. 68 Modeled after the Criminal
Justice Act of the United Kingdom, 69 the proposed legislation
imposes criminal liability on those who know or suspect that
someone is involved in laundering the proceeds of crime and
365. See India: Cabinet Approves Money Laundering Bill, BUSINESS LINE (THE HINDU),
Nov. 21, 1997, available in Westlaw, WL 15124928 (discussing provisions of bill).
366. See, e.g., The Professional Newswire: a Roundup of Money Laundering News, 7 No.
10 MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP. 8 (May 1997) (discussing provisions of Indo-Pakistani
agreement to cooperate in combatting drug trafficking and money laundering).
367. See India: Cabinet Approves Money Laundering Bill, supra note 361 (stating that
Money Laundering Prevention Bill ("MLPB") was cleared by executive cabinet of In-
dian government on November 20, 1997, and currently awaits approval from Parlia-
ment). While proponents of the bill had anticipated that it would be introduced to
Parliament at a much earlier date, disputes over the intended scope of the bill caused it
to be delayed by several months. See The Professional Newswire A Roundup of Money Laun-
dering News, 8 No. 3 MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP. 8, (October 1997) (discussing reasons
for why bill had yet to reach floor of legislature).
368. See The Professional Newswire A Roundup of Money Laundering News, supra note
363 (stating that major focus of deliberations of Committee of Secretaries that pre-
pared bill was on definition of money laundering). Two clear strands of thinking
emerged among the group charged with drafting the bill. Id. One group wanted to
include all forms of economic offenses which lead to money laundering within the pur-
view of the bill. Id. The other group wanted to limit the bill's application to a select
number of activities such as narcotics trafficking, and illegal arms dealing. See Abhijit
Doshi, Money Laundering Bill: Still a Black Hole, Bus. STANDARD, Sept. 25, 1997, at 13
(discussing differences among drafters with respect to how money laundering should
be defined).
The bill finally defined money laundering as "engaging directly or indirectly in a
transaction that involved property that is proceeds of crime, or receiving, possessing,
disguising, transferring, converting, disposing of, removing from or bringing into the
territory any property that is the proceeds of crime." See Indian Money Laundering Law to
Follow Commonwealth Draft, EcON. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1997, at 22. The bill defined crime as
all of the crimes included under the Indian Penal Code and certain crimes included
under the Prevention of Corruption Act, Prevention of Crime Act (India); Narcotics
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985, Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances Act 1985 (India); and the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act, Immoral Traffic Pre-
vention Act (India). See India: Cabinet Approves Money Laundering Bill, supra note 361.
Offenses such as over-invoicing, under-invoicing have also been included in the bill as a
means of plugging loopholes originating from the replacement of the Foreign Ex-
change Regulation Act with the Foreign Exchange Management Act. Id.
369. Criminal Justice Act 1993 (Eng.).
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fail to report it."'
The MLPB imposes a good deal of responsibility upon fi-
nancial institutions."' The MPLB proposed the enactment of a
currency transaction reporting requirement under which banks
would be required to report any transaction in excess of Rs. £ 10
million. 72 The Indian government included this provision in
the MPLB despite the Reserve Bank of India's373 ("RBI") vehe-
ment disapproval.374 In addition, banks will be responsible for
370. See Doshi, supra note 368, at 13 (describing controversial provisions of pro-
posed legislation). This provision, which places knowledge of money laundering activ-
ity on par with the actual perpetration of the crime itself, closely resembles Section 93 A
of the England's Criminal Justice Act 1993. Criminal Justice Act 1993 (Eng.). Whereas
in the United Kingdom there are three acts used to criminalize money laundering, the
proposed Anti-Money Laundering Bill prohibits the laundering of proceeds derived
from a number of different crimes. See Doshi, supra note 368, at 13. In this respect it is
somewhat similar to the United States anti-money laundering laws. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956
(prohibiting laundering of funds derived from number of different sources).
371. See India: Cabinet Clears Money Laundering Bill, AsIA PULSE, Nov. 21, 1997, avail-
able in Westlaw, 1997 WL 13572525 (discussing RBI's opposition to currency transaction
reporting requirement).
372. Id.
373. See Doshi, supra note 368, at 13 (discussing Reserve Bank of India ("RBI")
opposition to MPLB).
374. See id. at 13 (stating that RBI opposed inclusion of such reporting require-
ment upon two grounds). It believed that such a requirement would undermine the
long tradition in India of customer confidentiality. Id. The Public Financial Institutions
Act of 1993 codifies India's tradition of maintaining confidentiality in bank transac-
tions. Public Financial Institutions Act of 1993 (India). This reluctance to lift bank
secrecy laws also stems from a fear on the part of the banking industry that to do so
would lead to an erosion of customer confidence in the system and a possible decline in
investment. See Doshi, supra note 368, at 13 (discussing RBI's opposition to reporting
requirement). However, countries around the world have created similar legislation at
the expense of banking secrecy. See Zagaris, supra note 68, at 909 (stating that excep-
tions to right of financial privacy have been imposed throughout world). Furthermore,
the Reserve Bank's reluctance to comply with such a reporting requirement stands in
direct violation of the spirit of the Vienna Convention, as it precludes countries from
declining to act on the ground of bank secrecy. See Vienna Convention, supra note 4,
art. 5, 28 I.L.M. at 504.
The RBI also objected to the reporting requirement on the ground that the cur-
rent level of computerization among the banking industry was inadequate to handle
such a burden. See The Professional Newswire A Roundup of Money Laundering News, 8 No. 3
MONEY LAUNDEING L. REP. 8 (Oct. 1997) (discussing RBI's opposition to the bill).
However, the Committee of Secretaries charged with drafting the bill rejected this argu-
ment, noting that other countries are able to comply with such reporting requirements.
Id. Under current law, banks in India are required to comply with a relatively relaxed
set of Know-Your-Customer rules. See Doshi, supra note 364, at 13 (noting that banks are
required to establish identity of their customers through evidence of names, addresses,
and places of business). These current requirements, however, are not strictly en-
forced. Id. Effective know-your-customer rules are an essential part of an effective anti-
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reporting any transactions which they suspect may represent the
proceeds of crime, or are at all suspicious.3
75
The Committee of Secretaries had originally intended to in-
troduce the MLPB to Parliament in the monsoon season of Par-
liament.3 76 Disagreements over definitions and the scope of the
bill during the drafting stage, however, led to a delay of several
months.3 7 7 Cleared by the executive cabinet in November of
1997, the bill was scheduled to be passed by Parliament in its
winter session .378 Due to the current political instability in India,
the bill has been placed on hold and is still pending parliamen-
tary approval. 379
b. Establishment of Bilateral Agreements
In attempting to accomplish the stated objectives of the Vi-
enna Convention3 8 0 and the FATF recommendations,"' India
money laundering regime. See Zagaris, supra note 68, at 909-10 (discussing importance
of know your customer rules).
375. See Doshi, supra note 368, at 13 (discussing provision requiring banks to re-
port suspicious transactions).
376. See India: FEMA, Money Laundering Bill Under Fire, HINDU, June 8, 1997, at 9
(stating that government officials anticipate that bill may be ready before Monsoon
Season of Parliament).
377. See Doshi, supra note 368, at 13 (discussing problems drafters encountered in
agreeing on definition for money laundering).
378. See India: Cabinet Approves Money Laundering Bill, supra note 342 (stating that
Bill is slated for introduction and passing in Winter Session of Parliament).
379. See Indian Parliament is Dissolved; New Elections Will Delay Reforms, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 5, 1997, at A15 (discussing how political situation in India led government to place
bill on hold). In December of 1997, just weeks after the Bill was cleared by the execu-
tive cabinet of the government, India's president dissolved the Lokh Sabha, the lower of
Parliament. Id. This action on the part of the President set the stage for India's second
set of elections in two years. Id. The political crisis was prompted by allegations from
the Congress Party that a party in the multi-party United Front coalition, the govern-
ment ruling India at the time, supported guerilla groups linked to the 1991 assassina-
tion of the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Id. The elections in most regions of India
were held in February and March of this year. Id.
It seems as though the Hindu nationalist party the Bharatiya Janata Party ("BJP")
has emerged as the victor of the recent elections. See Jonathan Karp, BharatiyaJanata
Party Prepares to Assemble Majority in Parliament, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1998, at 4.
While the BJP did not secure an absolute majority of the of the available 539 seats, it
managed to gain control through a series of alliances with splinter political groups. Id.
In 1996, the BJP had also won the elections and formed a minority government which
lasted for 13 days before losing a vote of confidence. See Kenneth Cooper, Narayanan
Calls On Hindu Bloc; Party Asked to Show it could Rule India, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1998, at
A25. As a result of the India's tenuous political situation, the Bill will most likely be
delayed by several months until the situation settles and stability is resumed Id.
380. See Vienna Convention, supra note 4, art. 7(20), 28 I.L.M. at 511 (stating that
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has recently began entering into bilateral agreements aimed at
controlling drug trafficking and money laundering.382 In April
of 1995, India signed an agreement with Egypt to join efforts in
combating drug-related money laundering in the two coun-
tries 83  The agreement allows for the exchange of operational
intelligence, as well as the identification, freezing, and forfeiture
of property used in connection with narcotics related money
laundering.384
The Indian government entered into a similar, yet more
comprehensive agreement with the Pakistani government in
1997.385 The countries agreed to institute several cooperative
measures to control drug trafficking and money laundering, in-
cluding the fast and efficient exchange of information.3 86 The
governments also agreed to establish mechanisms for con-
ducting joint financial investigations and information ex-
changes.387 The two countries recently underwent discussion on
entering into a new agreement that would include other nations
within the region. 88
"parties shall consider, as may be necessary, the possibility of concluding bilateral or
multilateral agreements" that would serve purpose of enhancing mutual legal assistance
among parties).
381. See FATF Recommendations, supra note 99, Recommendation 33, 35 I.L.M. at
1299 (providing that international cooperation should be supported by network of bi-
lateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements based on generally shared legal
concepts with aim of providing practical measures to affect widest possible range of
mutual assistance).
382. See Zagaris, supra note 67, at 906-08 (opining that bilateral agreements are
effective instrument in combating money laundering because they can be tailored to fit
circumstances of two contracting parties). Unlike multilateral conventions, which often
must find a low common denominator between its members, bilateral agreements allow
for the establishment of a more specific regime. Id.
383. See The Professional Newswire A Roundup of Money Laundering News, 5 No. 10
MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP. 8 (May 1995) (discussing provisions of agreement).
384. Id.
385. See The Professional Newswire A Roundup of Money Laundering News, supra note
362 (discussing provisions and goals of Indo-Pakistani accord). The agreement be-
tween India and Pakistan was entered into effect on April 25, 1997. See India-Pakistan
Accord Takes Direct Aim at Heroin Trade, CHI. TIB., Apr. 26, 1997, at 18.
386. Id.
387. Id. Both countries also agreed to strengthen their respective anti-money laun-
dering regimes. Id.
388. See India: Money Laundering: Talks With Pakistan for Sharing Information, Busi-
NESS LINE (THE HINDU) Mar. 5, 1998, available in Westlaw, 1998 WL 7701775 (stating
that Indian and Pakistani government officials intend to direct their efforts towards
broader regional regime where members would share information and investigative ca-
pabilities with each other).
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c. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
India has begun to enter into mutual legal assistance agree-
ments with other countries as well.3"9 In 1997, the Indian gov-
ernment entered into an extradition treaty and mutual legal
assistance agreement with Russia.39 ° Mutual legal assistance
agreements facilitate the investigation of money laundering op-
erations in these countries by compelling the production of a
wide array of information often vital in money laundering prose-
cutions.391 This agreement will no doubt prove invaluable in fu-
ture investigations, given the growing amount of narcotics smug-
gled from India through Eastern Europe.392
Most recently the Indian government held a regional con-
ference on money laundering, bringing together many of the
countries of Southwest and Southeast Asia.3 93 The conference
was the product of ajoint effort between the Indian government,
the Global Programme Against Money Laundering and the
United Nations International Drug Control Programme. 94 One
stated objective of the conference was to increase commitment
389. See, e.g., Mutual Cooperation Agreement Bewteen Government of United
States of America and Government of India for Reducing Demand, Preventing Illicit
Use of and Traffic in Drugs and For Matters Relating to Licit Trade in Opiates, available
in Westlaw, 1990 WL 484505. India already has a mutual cooperation agreement with
the United States for preventing drug trafficking and for matters relating to licit trade
in opiates. Id. The agreement was signed and entered into force on March 29, 1990.
Id.
390. See Vladimir Radyuhin, Ahmadi for Close Judicial Interaction With Russia, THE
HINDU, Feb. 20, 1997, at 14 (discussing provisions of agreement and objectives of con-
tracting parties).
391. See New MLATs Extend U.S. Laundering Effort, supra note 30 (discussing how
mutual legal assistance treaties can facilitate money laundering investigations). Mutual
legal assistance Agreements often have a provision that enables a party to notify another
when it has reason to suspect that proceeds or instrumentalities of crime are located
within the territory of the other party. See Zagaris, supra note 67, at 906-08 (explaining
how MLATs are vital component of effective anti-money laundering regime). With mu-
tual legal assistance agreements, the parties are required to help each other to the
extent permitted by their respective domestic laws, in procedures relating to the immo-
bilization, seizure, and confiscation of proceeds or instrumentalities of crime. Id.
392. See Levitsky Address, supra note 345 (stating that dismantlement of Soviet
Union and establishment of independent states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia
have resulted in development of new drug routes into Europe).
393. See India: International Meet on Money Laundering, THE HINDU, Feb. 26, 1998,
available in Westlaw, 1998 WL 7732458 (stating that conference brought together ap-
proximately 30 government experts from Bangladesh, Bhutan, Iran, India, Maldives,
Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Thailand).
394. Id.
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within the region to combat money laundering by introducing
the necessary countermeasures. The conference also sought to
promote the harmonization of domestic strategies.3 9 ' The fact
that India was one of the co-sponsors of the conference demon-
strates to its neighboring countries its determination to combat
money laundering.
Many groups have widely criticized the Indian government's
initiatives in developing its anti-money laundering regime, par-
ticularly for the role the government intends to assign to
banks.39 6 In requiring banks to report all transactions that ex-
ceed a certain limit or that appear suspicious, Indian banks will
have to eliminate or radically alter their long established tradi-
tion of bank secrecy.39 v In fact, virtually all countries that have
enacted comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation have
drastically reduced a person's right to financial privacy.398
II. ARGUMENTS CONCERNING INDIA'S USE OF ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING LEGISLATION TO COMBAT ITS
HEROIN TRADE
Many countries are trying to control escalating levels of
drug trafficking through anti-money laundering legislation.399
In enacting anti-money laundering laws, these countries have
placed regulations upon their domestic financial industries.4 °°
395. Id,
396. See, e.g., Doshi, supra note 368, at 13 (discussing RBI's concerns about
MLPB).
397. See id. (discussing practice among banks of maintaining customer confidenti-
ality). The Public Financial Institutions Act of 1993 codifies India's long established
tradition of confidentiality in financial transactions. Public Financial Institutions Act of
1993 (India).
398. See Zagaris, supra note 68, at 909 (stating that erosion of financial secrecy is
principle of anti-money laundering law). Exceptions to the right to financial privacy
have been imposed in several countries as a method of combatting drug-related money
laundering. Id. For example, in the United States, under the BSA, banks must file a
Currency Transaction Report whenever a person engages in one or more cash transac-
tions in a day which exceeds in total US$10,000. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508,
84 Stat. 114 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5314t, 5216-5324). Even Switzer-
land, a country long known for its stringent bank secrecy policies, has relaxed its bank
secrecy laws in an attempt to control escalating levels of money laundering. See Her-
nandez, supra note 1, at 276-77 (noting that under recently enacted anti-money laun-
dering laws, banker who fails to conduct proper due diligence with respect to financial
transactions may face up to one year of imprisonment).
399. See, e.g., Drug Trafficking Act 1994, ch. 37 (Eng.).
400. See id. at § 50 (imposing criminal liability on anyone who enters arrangement
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As money laundering transactions are particularly vulnerable to
detection during stages that require a financial intermediary of
some sort, government officials in many countries have con-
cluded that strictly monitoring financial institutions will reduce
global money laundering and consequently drug trafficking.4"1
The strict regulation of the financial sector, however, is a
method of combatting money laundering that many are op-
posed to. 40 2
A. Arguments Against Enacting Anti-Money Laundering Legislation
That Imposes Stringent Regulations on the Financial Industry
Perhaps one of the strongest arguments against instituting
anti-money laundering laws which heavily regulate banks and fi-
nancial institutions is that such laws unduly erode the right of
the individual to financial privacy.4" 3 The basic philosophy of
bank secrecy regulation is that banks and financial institutions
must keep confidential any information relating to their clients'
property.40 4 The purpose behind bank secrecy laws is to protect
the privacy interest of a customer.40 5 As articulated in several
international instruments, 40 6 the right to privacy is an interna-
tional human right. 4 7 The individual's right to privacy, as evi-
to facilitate another's retention of drug money, and who knows or suspects that the
individual is someone who is benefiting from drug trafficking).
401. See Clark, supra note 16, at 470-72 (discussing reasons why anti-money laun-
dering legislation targets financial intermediaries).
402. See Sen, supra note 362 (discussing RBI's concern that such stringent regula-
tion of banking sector will conflict with current Indian banking laws).
403. See Hernandez, supra note 1, at 238 (noting that with emergence of interna-
tional cooperation in fight against narcotics trafficking and money laundering, long
established principle of bank secrecy, along with individual's right to privacy it pro-
tected, ceded to interest of global anti-rug enforcement).
404. See Charles Thelen Plombeck, Confidentiality and Disclosure: The Money Laun-
dering ControlAct of 1986 and Banking Secrecy, 22 Ir'L LAw 69 (1988) (explaining idea of
bank secrecy regulation).
405. See Hernandez, supra note 1, at 236-37 (discussing purpose behind bank se-
crecy protections). In the past, bank secrecy laws shielded individuals from financial
loss in countries shaken by political instability. Id. at 235. For example, during World
War II, the stringent bank secrecy laws of Switzerland protected the identity and assets
of refugees from nazi persecution. See Michael Moser, Note, Switzerland: New Exceptions
to Bank Secrecy Laws Aimed at Money Laundering and Organized Crime, 27 CASE W. REs. J.
INT'L L. 321 (1995) (discussing some historical uses for Swiss banking secrecy).
406. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217
A (III), U.N. Doc. A/A to 10, at art. 12 (1948) (stating that "no one shall be subject to
arbitrary interference in his privacy, family, home, or correspondence . ).
407. Id.
1998] INDIA'S HEROIN TRADE 2071
denced by the creation of bank secrecy laws in many countries,
extends to financial matters.4 °8 Government and financial offi-
cials in countries with long-standing traditions of bank secrecy 409
often fear that reducing or eliminating bank secrecy protections
would cause an erosion of customer confidence in their domes-
tic banking industries.410
An erosion in customer confidence in a country's banking
system can lead to capital flight.411 While capital movements en-
sure the existence of global capital markets, for several coun-
tries, especially those in critical stages of development, a large
capital outflow represents a significant economic problem.412
The maintenance of bank secrecy laws for many countries, is a
408. See Hernandez, supra note 1, at 240-41 (stating that right to privacy extends to
privacy in financial matters).
409. See id. at 243 (discussing how bank secrecy laws developed in many countries
as result of developments in Common Law of England). The right to financial privacy
and the concept of bank secrecy for many countries find their origins in the English
case of Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial and Union Bank of England. Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial
and Union Bank of Eng., (1924) 1 K.B. 461 (C.A.) [hereinafter Tournier]. In Tournier the
employee sued his bank for defamation and for breach of an implied confidentiality
because the bank had disclosed that he had failed to honor a check made to his book-
maker. Id. at 463. As a result of the bank's disclosure, the employee's contract was not
renewed. Id. at 475. The court in Tournier held that a bank owes an implied contractual
duty to a customer to abstain from disclosing any customer's financial information to
third parties. Id. at 475. Beyond its own precedential value in England, the Tournier
decision established the foundations for bank secrecy in several countries. See Her-
nandez, supra note 1, at 243-44 (discussing effect of Tournier decision on former British
colonies). Former British colonies that adopted various aspects of the British common
law, such as India, inherited and incorporated this idea of bank secrecy into their own
systems of law. Id.
410. See Sen, supra note 362 (discussing RBI's opposition to idea of mandatory
disclosure provision as facet of anti-money laundering laws). The RBI strongly opposed
the provision of the MLPB which compels banks to disclose transactions in excess of a
stipulated monetary limit. Id. The RBI felt that the inclusion of such a provision in
proposed anti-money laundering legislation would run contrary to existing laws regard-
ing bank secrecy. Id. The right to confidentiality in banking transactions is provided for
in the Public Financial Institutions Act of 1993. Public Financial Institutions Act of 1993
(India). The RBI feared that such a provision would an adverse effect on the banking
industry and ultimately lead to a decline in customer confidence in the system. See Sen,
supra note 362 (discussing RBI's fear that mandatory disclosure will lead to erosion in
customer confidence in banking system).
411. See Cynthia Lichtenstein et al., International Debt: IHow Can Developing Countries
Regain Creditworthiness?, 83 Am. Soc'v IN-r'L L. PRoc. 87, 100 (1989) (defining capital
flight as movement of capital from one country to another).
412. Id.; see also Quirk, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that many countries feel that
implementing stringent anti-money laundering legislation would impede economic lib-
eralization).
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method of preventing capital flight.' As such, the enactment
of anti-money laundering legislation that heavily regulates the
banking industry can lead to severe economic policy problems
for developing countries.414
In addition to arguments based on an infringement upon
an individual's right to financial privacy, opponents to anti-
money laundering legislation that removes bank secrecy laws ar-
gue that the enactment of such laws place an undue burden
upon banks and financial institutions.415 In order to comply
with the know-your-customer and suspicious transaction report-
ing requirements that exist in most comprehensive anti-money
laundering regimes, banks often disclose too much informa-
tion. 4 16 Under know-your-customer laws, a bank will never be
able to ascertain how much information it must require of its
customers before it is deemed to know them well enough.4 1 7 In
addition, suspicious transaction reporting obligations lack stan-
dards for determining exactly what constitutes a suspicious trans-
action.4 1 s Consequently, in order to shield themselves from
criminal liability, banks are likely to disclose more information
than they need.419 In some respects, under these laws, banks
413. See G. Philip Rutledge, Bank Secrecy Laws: An American Perspective, 14 DICK J.
INT'L L. 601, 602 (1996) (noting that developing countries faced with capital flight and
shortage of hard currency had adopted bank secrecy laws as economic development
measure).
414. See C. Todd Jones, Compulsion Over Comity: The United States'Assault on Foreign
Bank Secrecy, 12 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 454, 456 (1992) (noting that increased economic
and financial regulation led investors in certain countries to invest money in countries
with relaxed government policies with respect to bank secrecy).
415. See, e.g., Hernandez, supra note 1, at 299 (stating that know your customer
and laws that require banks to report any suspicious transactions place too much of a
burden of banks); see also Alford, supra note 16, at 467 (stating that under current U.S.
anti-money laundering legislation banks must "wrestle with the conflicting goals of law
enforcement and customer privacy.").
416. See Hernandez, supra note 1, at 299 (stating that know your customer rules
and suspicious transaction reporting requirements encourage overdisclosure at ex-
pense of an individual's privacy).
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id. This tendency towards overdisclosure is particularly apparent when finan-
cial institutions seeking to protect themselves from criminal liability can act without
fear of private action from the customer whose financial information is disclosed. Id.
For instance, in the United States, the Annunzio-Wylie Act shields banks from civil lia-
bility for the disclosure of customer information to law enforcement authorities. 31
U.S.C. § 5 3 18(g)(3). A provision exists under the DTA in the U.K. Drug Trafficking
Act 1994, ch. 37, § 50(3)(a). Under the DTA, an individual is protected against civil
liability for a breach any restrictions upon the disclosure of that information. Id. With
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and other financial institutions are compelled to take on the
role of law enforcement.4
20
In choosing what information to disclose to law enforce-
ment authorities, banks have relatively little guidance from law
enforcement authorities.4 21 Laws that require banks to report
any suspicious transactions to law enforcement agencies place
banks in a precarious position, by compelling them to choose
between the conflicting goals of law enforcement and customer
confidentiality.42 2 With every transaction, banks must weigh
these goals against each other in order to decide whether a
transaction is suspicious and should be reported despite the cus-
tomer's right to confidentiality.4 23 Many anti-money laundering
regimes do not provide guidelines which banks may adhere to in
making these determinations.4 24 Without the proper guidance,
banks are unable to make these decisions effectively.
42 5
Laws that require banks to report suspicious transactions
and require banks to learn as much as possible about their cus-
tomers place an investigatory burden on banks that they are not
equipped to handle.426 Such laws require banks to determine,
safe harbors such as these, it is in the best interest of a bank to disclose as much infor-
mation as possible, in order to ensure that it is not deemed a vehicle for money laun-
dering. See Hernandez, supra note 1, at 299 (discussing how anti-money laundering
statutes which regulate the everyday conduct of banks encourage banks to disclose
more customer information than necessary).
420. See Hernandez, supra note 1, at 302 (stating that if trend towards eliminating
bank secrecy and right to financial privacy continues, banks will become another
branch of government enforcement agencies).
421. See id. at 302 (discussing indicia used by banks to determine whether particu-
lar transaction is suspicious).
422. See Alford, supra note 16, at 467-68 (noting that government's objective is to
prevent money laundering as method of enforcing drug trafficking laws, while banks
goal is confidentiality of customer's transactions)
423. Id.
424. See Sultzer, supra note 25, at 215 (noting that it was not until the enactment of
Annunzio-Wylie Act that U.S. government created regulatory body to help in develop-
ment of BSA related reports). With the enactment of the Annunzio-Wylie Act, the U.S.
government created the Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group, consisting of people from
the treasury and justice departments as well as members of the financial industry and
others affected by the BSA. Id.
425. See Afford, supra note 16, at 467 (stating that protection from civil liability
provision in Annunzio-Wylie Act will aid banks in making more effective decisions with
respect to whether particular transaction should be reported to law enforcement au-
thorities).
426. See id. at 466 (stating that U.S. government, both domestically through An-
nunzio-Wylie Act and internationally through Vienna Convention, has placed heavier
regulatory burden on banks in effort to prevent money laundering); see also Rider, supra
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with every transaction, whether they are serving as a vehicle for
money laundering.4 27 Such laws place banks in yet another di-
lemma.4 28 When countries implement such stringent regulatory
laws, banks are faced with the dilemma of balancing the goal of
quick and efficient service with the goal of law enforcement.42 9
In order to extricate itself from any possible criminal liability, a
prudent bank will complete a transaction and then report it to
law enforcement authorities.4"' If compelled to report most of
its transactions, banks will incur increased costs, which will be
passed on to customers.43 ' Ultimately, such stringent regula-
tions on the financial industry will place a burden upon custom-
ers.
432
Another argument against the implementation of an anti-
money laundering regime that includes strict regulation of the
financial industry is that in order to avoid criminal liability,
banks will render themselves susceptible to civil liability.433
Some anti-money laundering laws provide for immunity from
breach of confidence actions if a bank reports confidential cus-
tomer information to law enforcement authorities.43 4 These stat-
note 30, at 419 (stating that more information financial intermediaries are required
obtain and test, more onerous will be their responsibilities).
427. See Alford, supra note 16, at 466-67 (discussing increased regulatory burden
imposed upon banks by stringent anti-money laundering legislation).
428. Id.
429. Id.; see also Hernandez, supra note 1, at 299 (stating that know your customer
and suspicious transaction requirements encourage banks to disclose more information
than needed to law enforcement authorities in order to avoid criminal liability).
430. See Alford, supra note 16, at 467 (stating that prudent bank will report transac-
tions to law enforcement authorities in order to ensure that it is not deemed vehicle for
drug traffickers to launder profits in violation of law).
431. Id.
432. Id. The RBI has made similar arguments against imposing stringent regula-
tions on the Indian banking industry in an effort to combat money laundering. See
Hema Ramakrishnan, India: RBI Stand on Bank Reporting Rejected, BUSINEss LINE (THE
HINDU), Sept. 19, 1997, available in Westlaw WL 13716083. The RBI argued that the
type of compliance contemplated by the MLPB is incompatible with the present level of
computerization in the banking industry. Id. The Indian government rejected the
RBI's argument, stating that the burden placed on banks would not be too heavy as
banks in less industrialized countries are able to comply with similar requirements. Id.
If the current level of computerization in the Indian banking industry is truly subpar,
then implementation of heightened know your customer laws and reporting require-
ments will result in increased costs for the banking industry and consequently, in-
creased costs for customers of Indian banks. Id.
433. See Clark, supra note 16, at 468 (stating that there are very real dangers posed
to banking industry by suspicion-based reporting system).
434. See, e.g., Drug Trafficking Act 1994, ch. 37, § 51 (5) (a) (providing that disclo-
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utory protections induce banks to disclose more information
than necessary because of the aegis they provide against civil lia-
bility for the disclosure of the information in question.435 Such
protections, however, are limited in application.43 6 While such
protections may grant banks immunity from breach of confi-
dence actions, they do not necessarily protect banks against
other civil claims such as defamation,437 breach of contract, 438 or
claims for loss suffered as a result of disclosure.439
In addition, opponents of anti-money laundering legislation
including reporting requirements and customer identity require-
ments state that such laws erode the client attorney privilege.44 °
A number of countries that are deemed to have comprehensive
sure of confidential financial information to law enforcement officers shall not consti-
tute a breach of any restriction upon the disclosure of information imposed by statute
or otherwise); see also, Annunzio-Wylie Act § 1517(b), 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (3) (providing
that banks shall not be liable under federal or state law for disclosure of customer infor-
mation to law enforcement authorities).
435. See Hernandez, supra note 1, at 299 (stating that suspicious transaction re-
quirements and know your customer laws encourage banks to overdisclose).
436. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 16, at 468 (stating that banks may still face claims
from clients for refusing to carry out client's instructions if bank reported transaction
to law enforcement officials).
437. See id. at 468 (stating that if financial intermediary reports suspicion which is
found to be groundless, CJA protects it from claims for breach of confidence, yet leaves
open possibility of claims for defamation or breach of contract). If a bank reported its
suspicion that a particular client was involved in money laundering and news of the
allegation reached the market place, thereby damaging the customer's reputation, the
customer could bring an action against the bank for defamation. Id.
438. Id.
439. See id. at 499-500 (raising hypothetical case where bank could be faced with
claims for losses suffered as result of it disclosure of customer information). It is possi-
ble that the disclosure of financial information could result in lost business opportuni-
ties for a customer whose financial information is reported. Id. For example, if a bank
reports a suspicious transaction, and refuses to follow a client's instructions until the
suspicions are deemed groundless, the contemplated transaction could fall apart as a
result of the delay. Id. If the allegation is subsequently deemed groundless, the cus-
tomer could feasibly bring suit for the loss it incurred or for defamation. Id. Legislation
that protects banks, and other financial intermediaries from suits based on a breach of
confidence. Id. These protections do not extend to actions based on breach of con-
tract. Id. In order to avoid being deemed a vehicle through which money is laundered,
a bank could find itself vulnerable to a number of civil actions. Id.
440. See Hernandez, supra note 1, at 302-03 (stating that know your customer and
reporting requirements eliminate, among other things, traditional attorney-client like
privilege, whereby bankers and professionals normally did not inquire into transactions
and background of their clients); see also, Wendy Shuck, The Impact of Anti-money Laun-
dering Laws on Attorney-Client Privilege, 19 SUFFOLK TRASNKr'L L. REv. 507, 515 (1996)
(stating that attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between cli-
ent and attorney made for purpose of securing legal advice). The privilege enables
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anti-money laundering legislation, apply their laws to a host of
financial intermediaries, including lawyers. 4 41  For example,
some anti-money laundering laws impose criminal liability on
those who assist a money launderer in retaining the proceeds of
the money laundering operations where the individual knows or
suspects that a person receiving aid is involved in drug traffick-
ing.442 As a result of such laws, a lawyer who may suspect that a
client is involved in money laundering, but accepts the client's
assurances to the contrary, could face criminal liability in the
event that the client is actually involved in money laundering.443
Under such a scenario, it would be difficult for the lawyer to
avoid liability, because he had suspicions, but failed to disclose
them because the information was confidential.444
B. Arguments in Favor of Enacting Anti-Money Laundering
Legislation That Imposes Stringent Regulations on the
Financial Industry
Proponents of anti-money laundering regimes that include
the strict regulation of the financial industry recognize that such
laws place a large burden upon banks. 445 The question for these
proponents becomes whether the costs of the resulting changes
to banking operations are worth the improved prevention of
clients to disclose information which otherwise would not have been disclosed and per-
mits attorneys to provide informed advice. Id.
441. See Drug Trafficking Act 1994, ch. 37, § 51 (4) (Eng.) (stating that provision
for any person of goods or services which are of assistance to him in drug trafficking
shall constitute offense under Act); see also I.R.C. § 60501 (1998) (stating that any per-
son who is engaged in a trade or profession, who in course of such trade or business
receives more than US$10,000 in cash, in aggregate, shall report such transaction to
Internal Revenue Service); see also Hernandez, supra note 1, at 303 (stating that even
Switzerland no longer permits registered financial intermediaries, such as lawyers and
accountants, to accept money on behalf of clients without disclosing identity or needs
of clients).
442. See Drug Trafficking Act 1994, ch. 37, §49(3) (Eng.) (criminalizing act of aid-
ing money launderer to retain proceeds of money laundering). It is a defense to this
provision that the potential offender notifies law enforcement authorities on his initia-
tive and as soon as reasonably practicable. Drug Trafficking Act 1994, ch. 37,
§ 49(4)(Eng.).
443. Id.
444. See Clark, supra note 16, at 494-95 (discussing dilemma faced by law firms as
result of U.K. anti-money laundering legislation).
445. See Alford, supra note 16, at 438 (noting that U.S. anti-money laundering laws
place increasing regulatory burden upon banks).
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money laundering and drug trafficking.446 These proponents
argue that the benefits of controlling money laundering and
drug trafficking outweigh the burdens placed on financial insti-
tutions.44 7
A money laundering operation requires some sort of finan-
cial intermediary in order to successfully launder the funds back
into the legitimate economy.448 As the use of a bank or other
financial institution is vital to the success of a money launderer,
it seems that the most logical area to direct anti-money launder-
ing efforts is at the financial industry. 449 The rationale behind
heavily regulating the financial industry is that if banks and
other financial intermediaries are required to report their suspi-
cions, the money launderer will find it more difficult to accom-
plish his goals.45 °
Another reason why many anti-money laundering regimes
compel financial institutions to comply with increased regula-
tions is because there are certain stages in the money laundering
process that are more vulnerable to detection than others.455
These stages include the entry of cash into the financial sys-
tem,452 the cross-border flows of cash, and transfers within and
from the financial system.4 53  These stages, where the money
laundering process is most easily detected, require the participa-
446. See id. at 466 (noting how anti-money laundering statutes require banks to
become more aware of money laundering problem and to take steps to combat it).
447. See id. (concluding that benefits to hindering global money laundering and
drug trafficking outweigh any burden born by banks and bank customers); see also Her-
nandez, supra note 1, at 238 (noting that with emergence of international cooperation
in fight against drug trafficking and money laundering, long embraced principles of
bank secrecy and individual's right to financial privacy ceded to interests of global anti-
drug enforcement).
448. See Clark, supra note 16, at 471 (noting that launderers erect veil of legitimacy
through incorporation of vehicle for laundering such as bank).
449. See id. at 470 (stating that it is perhaps inevitable that law enforcement author-
ities should lean so heavily upon financial institutions given their crucial role in money
laundering process).
450. Id.
451. See Afford, supra note 16, at 439 (stating that money laundering process is
most susceptible to detection by law enforcement authorities during placement stage,
when funds are first deposited into financial institution).
452. See Alford, supra note 16, at 439 (discussing how money laundering process is
particularly susceptible to detection at placement stage); Clark, supra note 16, at 470
(describing layering stage of money laundering process).
453. See Clark, supra note 16, at 470-71 (discussing why financial intermediaries
are compelled by legislation to comply with law enforcement authorities).
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tion of banks.454 Consequently, law enforcement officials believe
that strict regulation of banks and other deposit taking institu-
tions will result in a decrease in money laundering activity.455
The proponents of regulating the financial industry as a method
of combating money laundering and drug trafficking argue that
such strict regulation may be the only way to detect money laun-
dering operations.456
Money laundering has severe negative effects on a country's
macroeconomy. 457 For instance, money laundering has a signifi-
cant income distribution effect.4 58  In countries where money
laundering remains relatively unchecked, it redirects income
from high savers to low savers.459 Where money is shifted from
sound investments to riskier low quality investments, the eco-
nomic growth of a country suffers.46 ° With proper financial in-
dustry regulation, these adverse macroeconomic effects can be
alleviated if not eliminated.461
In addition, money laundering can deter legitimate invest-
ment from entering a country.4 6 2 Illegal transactions have the
ability to deter legitimate transactions by contamination.4 63 For
example, certain transactions involving foreign parties, which
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id. The metaphor of dropping a stone into a body of water is appropriate. Id.
When the proceeds of crime are first deposited into the financial system, it creates a
noticeable ripple, but if unnoticed, it may remain undiscovered. Id.
457. See Quirk, supra note 3, at 8 (stating that because amount of money laun-
dered through financial system is difficult to measure, money laundering distorts eco-
nomic data and complicates government efforts to manage economic policy).
458. See id. (stating that money demand appears to shift from country to country as
result of global money laundering, which results in misleading monetary data, and can
have adverse effects on exchange and interest rates).
459. Id.
460. Id. For example, studies suggest that funds from tax evasion in the U.S. are
often channeled into riskier but higher yielding investments. Id.
461. Id. Cognizant of the ability to prevent these adverse economic consequences
of money laundering through increased regulation of the financial industry, several
international organizations including the Basle Committee and the FATF financial insti-
tutions to cooperate with law enforcement authorities in an effort to control money
laundering. Id.
462. See id. at 8-9 (discussing indirect macroeconomic effects of money launder-
ing).
463. Id. This leads to the conclusion that the enactment of bank secrecy laws as
economic development measure is misguided. See Rutledge, supra note 411, at 602
(stating that developing countries faced with capital flight and lack of hard currency
have adopted bank secrecy laws as economic development measures).
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are completely legal, can become less desirable as a result of an
association with money laundering. 64 Anti-money laundering
regulation aimed at regulating the financial industry will further
ensure that countries do not reject legitimate foreign invest-
ments.
4 6 5
III. INDIA SHOULD IMPLEMENT AND ENFORCE A
COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-MONEY LA UNDERING REGIME
India should implement and enforce an anti-money laun-
dering regime if it intends to curb its escalating drug problem.
The proposed Money Laundering Prevention Bill,466 as well as
the other initiatives that India has taken in recent years, demon-
strate its desire to join in the international effort at combating
money laundering and narcotics trafficking. In order to estab-
lish an effective anti-money laundering regime the Indian gov-
ernment must implement comprehensive compliance regula-
tions for the entire financial industry,467 create an efficient regu-
latory body, and establish additional mutual legal assistance
treaties.
A. It is to India's Economic Advantage to Enact Anti-money
Laundering Legislation
It will be to India's domestic as well as international eco-
nomic benefit to enact anti-money laundering legislation. Fur-
ther delay will likely alienate those nations currently involved in
the international effort to combat money laundering and illicit
drug trafficking. India is one of the largest economies in the
world, with a growing economic power and a highly sophisti-
cated financial sector. While the financial industry may have res-
ervations about a strict compliance program, the adoption of an
anti-money laundering regime will set an example for other
countries in the area plagued by drug trafficking and money
464. See Quirk, supra note 3, at 9 (stating that confidence in markets and in effi-
ciency-signaling role of profits is eroded by money laundering).
465. Id.
466. See supra note 367 and accompanying text (discussing development of
MLPB).
467. See supra note 374 and accompanying text (noting that proposed Money
Laundering Prevention Bill only contemplates creating compliance programs for banks
rather than all deposit taking financial institutions).
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laundering.46
Furthermore, an attempt to criminalize money laundering
activities will eventually aid the Indian economy in attracting le-
gitimate investment.469 Money laundering transactions have the
ability to deter legitimate foreign investment. 470 With the enact-
ment of anti-money laundering legislation, those placing funds
in the Indian economy will be individuals interested in legiti-
mate investment opportunities in India, as opposed to those who
merely shift their money from country to country in an effort to
launder the proceeds of their illicit activity.
B. India Must Enact Broad Anti-Money Laundering Legislation
It is imperative that India enacts legislation that prohibits
money laundering in all forms.47 Legislation that freezes the
assets of those involved in narcotics trafficking and other crimes
is an integral component of an anti-money laundering re-
gime.472 But such legislation, without additional laws designed
to enforce the government's prohibition of the crime, is insuffi-
cient to curtail money laundering.
4 73
1. India Must Strictly Regulate Its Financial Industry
In addition to creating laws that criminalize the laundering
of the proceeds of crime, India must also enact strict compliance
programs for the financial industry that make it more difficult to
launder money. Financial institutions must be compelled to re-
port suspicious transactions, as such reporting requirements in-
crease the probability that law enforcment officers will detect
468. See supra notes 373-74 and accompanying text (discussing RBI opposition to
certain provisions in MLPB requiring banks to report transactions exceeding a stipu-
lated limit).
469. See supra notes 410 and accompanying text (detailing fear amongst banking
experts that strict compliance program would reduce customer confidence and ulti-
mately reduce investment).
470. See supra notes 462-64 and accompanying text (discussing how money laun-
dering transactions have ability to contaminate legitimate transactions).
471. See supra note 333 (opining that despite government initiatives aimed at com-
bating money laundering, India is notorious for money laundering). As a party to the
Vienna Convention, India currently criminalizes money laundering as it relates to nar-
cotics trafficking. Id.
472. See supra note 333 and accompanying text (discussing current Indian assets
forfeiture laws).
473. See supra note 335 and accompanying text (discussing how money launderers
are able to circumvent India's prohibition on money laundering).
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money laundering operations.474 Furthermore, financial institu-
tions should train employees to spot potentially suspicious activ-
ity. The placement stage of the money laundering process is the
most vulnerable to detection.475 As such, if bank employees are
able to identify the characteristics of money laundering transac-
tions, they will detect more transactions. Such training could en-
able law enforcement authorities to apprehend and convict an
even larger percentage of money launderers.
In addition, financial institutions within India should insti-
tute identification requirements similar to the know-your-cus-
tomers rules.47 6 Financial institutions should be required to ob-
tain substantial information about their clients in order to en-
sure that they are engaged in legitimate business activity. Such a
system would allow banks to discover suspicious transactions with
greater ease.
The creation of a strict regulatory regime for financial insti-
tutions will require financial institutions to abandon their
polices of customer confidentiality.4 77 In order to establish com-
prehensive anti-money laundering legislation, India must limit
the scope of the right to financial privacy. If banks are to comply
with strict governmental regulation, they must be able to do so
without the fear of future actions against them for breach of con-
tract or defamation.
2. India Must Negotiate Additional Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties
Finally India must negotiate additional MLATs with other
countries. MLATs are invaluable to international judicial assist-
ance. They supplement existing international agreements and
will enable law enforcement officials to obtain information in a
form admissible in Indian courts. In addition, the enactment of
MLATs will enable India to tailor its anti-money laundering re-
474. See supra notes 449-54 (discussing importance of requiring financial institu-
tions to report suspicious transactions).
475. Id.
476. See supra note 273 and accompanying text (discussing use of know your cus-
tomer rules in U.S. anti-money laundering legislation).
477. See supra notes 405-09 and accompanying text (discussing ideas of bank se-
crecy and right to financial privacy).
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gime to specific problems that the government faces.47
IV. CONCLUSION
Money laundering poses a major challenge to India as a re-
sult of the volume of funds derived from drug trafficking that
pass through its financial institutions. The lack of an anti-money
laundering regime in India, combined with its statu as a major
transit point in the international drug trade, makes it an attrac-
tive area for money launderers. If India intends to curb its esca-
lating drug problem, it must take an aggressive stance with re-
spect to money laundering.
478. See supra note 382 and accompanying text (discussing benefits to establishing
bilateral agreements).
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